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INTRODUCTION
“On September 11, 2001 . . . ”
When a sentence or a story begins with this familiar phrase, its boundaries and its ultimate conclusion are already clear. In the same way that
“Once upon a time” immediately embeds the reader or listener in a world of
fantasy and possibility, this opening phrase embeds her in a narrative and
discourse of national security and terrorism that has emerged from that horrific day. Over nine years later, this discourse has stretched to almost every
aspect of today’s society and enveloped innumerable people, institutions,
words, and practices. The discourse has spanned two presidential elections
and helped fuel a new President’s rise to the Oval Office based on a campaign of change. Within the judicial system, a spate of cases embedded in
this discourse have forced the Supreme Court to address aspects of the Constitution and issues of international law that it has had little opportunity to
address in the past as well as to reengage with the difficult issues of past
wartime precedents.
This Note explores the impact that this discourse has had within the
Judicial Branch. Using the terminology outlined by Michel Foucault in The
Archaeology of Knowledge, this Note describes a troubling judicial perspective in the current Guantánamo habeas litigation and offers a solution. Jacques Derrida famously said, il n’y a pas de hors-texte, or “there is nothing
outside of the text.”1 The “text” of post-9/11 jurisprudence is not only the
written language of judicial opinions, law reviews, and speeches; it is also
the practices of speaking: the authority to speak, the referents of speech,
and the exclusion of speech.
This Note argues that this text—the narrative, institutional practices,
and rhetoric of 9/11—has formed what Foucault calls a “discursive formation,” a unified system of relationships, authority, and exclusion.2 This
post-9/11 discursive formation has actively and inconspicuously constructed a constrained judicial role in the ongoing Guantánamo habeas litigation.
Although numerous politicians, democratic theorists, and
constitutional scholars have debated the proper role of judges in these habeas cases, they have not examined the power of post-9/11 discourse to
construct this role. Speaking from within this discursive formation, without
recognizing its power to determine the permissible scope of meaning and
the appropriate fields of reference, courts have not engaged the complexity
that scholars have recognized.
Foucault’s discursive formation consists, at the most basic level, of an
individual unit of discourse, traditionally translated as “statement” or “ut1

JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY 158 (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak trans., corrected ed.
1998) (1967).
2
See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 31–39 (A.M. Sheridan Smith trans.,
Random House 1972) (1969).
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terance” in The Archaeology of Knowledge.3 However, Foucault himself
actually used a distinct term, énoncé, to ensure that readers did not conflate
the concept with the traditional idea of a sentence or proposition,4 and some
commentators have recognized the difficulty of translating énoncé into English in a way that conveys its connection to discourse.5 For the purposes of
this Note, I will use the French énoncé in order to convey the unique concept so fundamental to Foucault’s insight. Within a discursive formation,
certain énoncés—such as “war,” “national security,” and “unlawful enemy
combatant” within the post-9/11 discourse—are treated as part of a single
unity with a single origin. In the post-9/11 discursive formation, these concepts have been the unexamined foundation upon which the discourse rests.
These énoncés have led to a widespread acceptance in the D.C. Circuit that
it is not the “province of the judiciary to draft definitions.”6 Recognizing
the novelty and discontinuity of these terms embedded in the current discursive text, however, demonstrates the error of this proposition and the necessity for the judicial excavation of discourse.
Part I introduces the post-9/11 judicial discourse and argues that it has
created a Foucauldian discursive formation. Part I first discusses the framing of 9/11 as the origin of a unified discourse and then considers the Supreme Court’s first attempt to wrestle with the question of whom the
President may detain in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.7 Part I concludes by describing
Foucault’s conception of a discursive formation and arguing that the post9/11 discourse fits within this concept.
Part II describes the judicial discourse concerning the detention of
enemy combatants that has followed the Supreme Court’s decision in Boumediene v. Bush.8 These habeas proceedings are especially instructive as to
the judicial role because they represent the historical means by which the
Judicial Branch has balanced and checked executive power.9 By contrasting the approaches to defining “enemy combatant” taken by the Fourth Circuit and the D.C. district and circuit courts, Part II demonstrates the power
of discourse to constrain the judicial role.
3

See id. at 79–135.
Énoncé is traditionally translated as “statement” in Foucault’s writings, to avoid any confusion
with the English idea of a “sentence” or “proposition.” See id. at 90–91; The Intellectual and Politics:
Foucault and the Prison, HIST. PRESENT, Spring 1986, at 1, 21 n.1 [hereinafter Deleuze Interview] (interviewing Gilles Deleuze).
5
See, e.g., HUBERT L. DREYFUS & PAUL RABINOW, MICHEL FOUCAULT: BEYOND STRUCTURALISM
AND HERMENEUTICS 44–48 (2d ed. 1983); ALAN SHERIDAN, MICHEL FOUCAULT: THE WILL TO TRUTH
99–100 (1980); Deleuze Interview, supra note 4, at 21 n.1.
6
Boumediene v. Bush, 583 F. Supp. 2d 133, 134 (D.D.C. 2008).
7
542 U.S. 507 (2004).
8
553 U.S. 723 (2008).
9
See id. at 797 (“Within the Constitution’s separation-of-powers structure, few exercises of judicial
power are as legitimate or as necessary as the responsibility to hear challenges to the authority of the
Executive to imprison a person.”).
4
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Part III offers further explication of Foucault’s insights into the operation of discursive formations and applies them to this habeas litigation. It
explores each of the three “spaces” in Foucault’s discursive theory that
were identified by philosopher Gilles Deleuze—the collateral space, the
correlative space, and the complementary space10—to demonstrate the effects of the post-9/11 discursive formation on judicial approaches. Finally,
Part III argues that the judiciary has been speaking from within this discursive formation and allowing it to construct its judicial province without investigation.
Part IV advocates that judges, in determining the extent of the President’s detention power, recognize Foucault’s insight and conduct an archaeological excavation of the post-9/11 discourse. This endeavor consists
first in excavating its presupposed unities embodied in énoncés. After
doing so, judges must then examine the remnants and make “controlled decisions”11 in order to construct basic principles. These principles will give
notice to the political branches about the principles that should guide their
decisions in the aftermath of 9/11. Perhaps more importantly, though, by
conducting such an archaeological excavation, judges will make clear the
“plinths,”12 or foundations, upon which their decisions rest. In doing so,
they will promote a dynamic dialogue and criticism about these issues that
will sharpen and define the disagreements so that the Supreme Court will be
able to see their full extent more clearly when making an ultimate decision.
Although the insights of this Note may apply beyond the discourse relating
to the detention of enemy combatants, this Note focuses solely on this discourse, exhibited principally in various habeas proceedings.
Whatever outcome these principles then dictate is a question for the individual judge. Without this archaeology, however, the text—the discursive formation—is constructing a judicial province that proscribes the
drafting of definitions. This proscription, as Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson
pointed out in al-Marri v. Pucciarelli,13 prevents the Judicial Branch from
giving notice to the political branches and restricts judicial dialogue about
10

GILLES DELEUZE, FOUCAULT 4–9 (Seán Hand ed. & trans., 1988) (1986).
FOUCAULT, supra note 2, at 29.
12
Deleuze uses this metaphor to describe the foundation of meaning in Foucauldian theory.
DELEUZE, supra note 10, at 16. “Plinth” refers to the square stone that supports a column or statue.
NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 1344 (3d ed. 2010). More importantly, the plinth is traditionally
the fundamental support for the column or statue. See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (online ed. 2011),
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/145854?redirectedFrom=plinth# (quoting a 1611 dictionary of French
and English as defining “plinthe” as “a flat, and square peece of Masonrie, &c., placed sometimes aboue, sometimes below, the footstall (but euer the first of the Basis) of a piller.” (emphasis added)).
Thus, in seeking to unearth the plinths of discourse as this Note advocates, a judge will be seeking to
unearth the ultimate foundational ideas that support the énoncés on which many judges up to this point
have relied.
13
See 534 F.3d 213, 295–303 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), vacated as moot sub nom. al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009) (mem.).
11
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fundamental principles. Part IV concludes by contrasting the two opinions
in Boumediene by Justices Kennedy and Scalia. While Justice Scalia relied
on presupposed unities and refused to excavate the énoncés on which his
reasoning relied, Justice Kennedy implicitly understood Foucault’s insight
into the necessity for excavation and archaeology. Justice Kennedy’s archaeological excavation of sovereignty and the extraterritorial reach of the
writ of habeas corpus in Boumediene represents the same approach to the
judicial role that Judge Wilkinson displayed in al-Marri when determining
the definition of “enemy combatants” and the scope of the President’s authority to detain.14 Although the D.C. district court expressly rejected Judge
Wilkinson’s judicial approach and the D.C. Circuit implicitly declined to
adopt it, this Note argues that these judges only did so because they failed
to realize the constructive power of discourse. Foucault’s insights make
apparent the power of this post-9/11 discourse and demonstrate the need for
the archaeological excavation this Note advocates.
I. THE POST-9/11 DISCURSIVE FORMATION
The simple words “September 11th” stand for the proposition, at least
in the collective American psyche, that the world has changed.15 Philosophers have called 9/11 an unnamable event, known only by the date because
its terror and trauma exist beyond the ability of language to provide a
name.16 September 11th is the event that everyone identifies as a new beginning, the ultimate reference for almost everything that has followed in
American foreign policy and the origin of the “Global War on Terror”
(GWOT).17 Although history is constantly subject to reexamination and revision, public memory has rigidified 9/11 into an iconic form: “an instant
memory”18 that is the fundamental reference point for anything relating to
national security or foreign policy. A post-9/11 discourse exists because
September 11th is an unmoving foundation, a fixed origin that relates to all
aspects of the discursive formation that has resulted.
This Part first explores the discourse about war and detention following 9/11. Next, it illustrates the Supreme Court’s reliance in Hamdi on historical conceptions of national security as well as its emphasis on

14

See id.
See Daniel R. Williams, After the Gold Rush—Part I: Hamdi, 9/11, and the Dark Side of the Enlightenment, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 341, 398 (2007).
16
GIOVANNA BORRADORI, PHILOSOPHY IN A TIME OF TERROR: DIALOGUES WITH JÜRGEN
HABERMAS AND JACQUES DERRIDA 147 (2003).
17
See Williams, supra note 15, at 401–02 (“So thick is the swirl of rhetoric about 9/11 as instantiating something new, something sui generis, something that is decidedly not part of some larger narrative,
seeing 9/11 from within the United States as a fruition of some trajectory within the currents of our own
culture can only seem insane, if not traitorous.”).
18
John Ellis van Courtland Moon, The Death of Distinctions: From 9/11 to Abu Ghraib, POL. &
LIFE SCI., Sept. 2004, at 2, 10.
15
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“necessity” in its post-9/11 discourse. Finally, utilizing Foucault’s insights
into discourse, this Part argues that 9/11 functions as the origin of a “discursive formation,” an entity composed of the interrelated text, authorities, and
practices within a discourse.19
A. The Beginnings of the Debate over Presidential Power
Immediately after the attacks, President Bush and Congress worked together to craft legislative authorization for the use of force against the perpetrators of 9/11. These negotiations resulted in the Authorization for the
Use of Military Force (AUMF), which empowered the President to use
all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks . . . , or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any
future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations,
organizations or persons.20

Initially, the President wanted the authority to “deter and pre-empt any future acts of terrorism or aggression against the United States,” but Congress
insisted that the legislation only authorize force against those connected to
the 9/11 attacks.21
Based on this authorization to use “all necessary and appropriate force”
and the President’s inherent powers as Commander in Chief,22 the Administration concluded that it was “necessary” as part of this war on terror “for
individuals subject to this order” to be tried by military tribunals.23 The
Administration turned to the World War II case Ex parte Quirin24 to create a
label for individuals subject to detention: “unlawful enemy combatants.” In
Quirin, the Supreme Court determined that a group of German saboteurs,
19

See FOUCAULT, supra note 2, at 31–39.
Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001)
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2006)). On September 14, 2001, both houses of Congress approved
the AUMF, and on September 18, 2001, President Bush signed it into law. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L.
Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2050 n.4
(2005).
21
See David Abramowitz, The President, the Congress, and Use of Force: Legal and Political Considerations in Authorizing Use of Force Against International Terrorism, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 71, 73
(2002) (quoting Draft Joint Resolution Authorizing the Use of Force).
22
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
23
Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed.
Reg. 57,833, 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001). This document defined an “individual subject to this order” as
any individual for whom there was “reason to believe” that he (1) was a present or past member of al
Qaeda, (2) had “engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of international terrorism, or
acts in preparation therefor” that “caused, threaten[ed] to cause, or ha[d] as their aim to cause, injury to
or adverse effects on the United States, its citizens, national security, foreign policy, or economy,” or (3)
“knowingly harbored” such an individual, provided that detention was “in the interest of the United
States.” Id. at 57,834.
24
317 U.S. 1, 45 (1942).
20
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including one who claimed American citizenship, who had surreptitiously
entered the United States to detonate explosives, were “unlawful enemy
belligerents” according to the laws of war.25 The Court drew a distinction
between those members of an enemy nation’s armed forces who follow the
laws of war and those who do not, offering numerous examples of espionage and sabotage to make the distinction clear.26 In the Quirin opinion, the
“lawful” aspect of “unlawful” referred to the laws of war governing disputes between two nations, and the terms “combatant” or “belligerent” referred to individuals under the direction of the German army. Using the
constructed label “unlawful enemy combatant” after 9/11 to refer to terrorism suspects, then, provided the advantage of a foundation in earlier U.S.
case law,27 an association with the discourse of war, and a broadly applicable term without much definition beyond the unique facts of Quirin.
A 2002 letter written by President Bush’s General Counsel to the Department of Defense offered one of the first definitions of the post-9/11 unlawful enemy combatant: “an individual who, under the laws and customs
of war, may be detained for the duration of an armed conflict.”28 The definition did not define exactly who could be considered an unlawful enemy
combatant but only provided that the military had authority to detain individuals who were subject to detention based on the laws and customs of
war. According to the letter, the authority for this power derived from two
distinct places: (1) the power of a nation in war to detain combatants for the
duration of hostilities and (2) the language in Quirin establishing that
“[c]itizens who associate themselves with the military arm of the enemy
government, and . . . enter this country bent on hostile acts are enemy belligerents within the meaning of the Hague Convention and the law of war.”29
Under this framework, once a military officer or administration official de25

Id. at 20–31.
The Court reasoned: “By universal agreement and practice, the law of war draws a distinction between the armed forces and the peaceful populations of belligerent nations and also between those who
are lawful and unlawful combatants.” Id. at 30–31 (footnote omitted). Speaking of unlawful enemy
combatants, the Court offered “[t]he spy who secretly and without uniform passes the military lines of a
belligerent in time of war, seeking to gather military information and communicate it to the enemy, or an
enemy combatant who without uniform comes secretly through the lines for the purpose of waging war
by destruction of life or property” as “familiar examples of belligerents who are generally deemed not to
be entitled to the status of prisoners of war, but to be offenders against the law of war subject to trial and
punishment by military tribunals.” Id. at 31. The Court also considered examples of spies before the
adoption of the Constitution and during the Mexican and Civil Wars. Id. at 31 n.9, 32 n.10.
27
See Allison M. Danner, Defining Unlawful Enemy Combatants: A Centripetal Story, 43 TEX.
INT’L L.J. 1, 3 (2007).
28
LOUIS FISHER, MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER: AMERICAN REVOLUTION TO
THE WAR ON TERRORISM 221 (2005) (quoting Letter from William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of
Def., to Senator Carl Levin 1–2 (Nov. 26, 2002) [hereinafter Haynes Letter]).
29
Id. at 222 (quoting Haynes Letter, supra note 28, at 1–2 (quoting Quirin, 317 U.S. at 37–38)); accord Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 47 (D.D.C. 2009) (acknowledging Haynes’s letter and the
Quirin language).
26
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termined that an individual should be designated an enemy combatant, this
determination would be sufficient to ensure the label’s validity.30 The judiciary, then, would have no place in the determination.
The Supreme Court rejected this contention in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and
insisted that due process dictates that an enemy combatant, at least a U.S.
citizen, must receive “notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a
fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker.”31 The Hamdi Court, in a plurality opinion by Justice
O’Connor, specifically noted that it was only answering the “narrow question” of whether the President had the authority under the AUMF to detain
an individual who was part of the Taliban forces and had fought against the
United States forces on a battlefield.32 Justice O’Connor later reemphasized
the narrowness of the plurality’s holding, finding that “[b]ecause detention
to prevent a combatant’s return to the battlefield is a fundamental incident
of waging war, . . . Congress [through the AUMF] has clearly and unmistakably authorized detention in the narrow circumstances considered
here.”33 However, the Court did note that “[i]f the practical circumstances
of a given conflict are entirely unlike those of the conflicts that informed
the development of the law of war, th[e] understanding [that the AUMF allows indefinite detention] may unravel.”34 Despite this clear statement that
the analogies to past wars and the historical law of war may “unravel” at
some point, most judges after Hamdi have declined to examine the “practical circumstances” of the GWOT. Judge Wilkinson of the Fourth Circuit
engaged in such an endeavor after the Boumediene decision,35 but the judges
of the D.C. federal courts declined to follow his example.36
The Hamdi Court expressly declined to outline the contours of the unlawful enemy combatant category,37 relying on the lower courts to attempt
the task first and provide some common law adjudication of the issue. The
Court also did not elaborate on whether different purposes for detention,
other than “to prevent a combatant’s return to the battlefield,” would also be

30

See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 537 (2004) (plurality opinion) (recognizing that under the
Bush Administration’s classification procedures, the “Executive’s factual assertions go wholly unchallenged or are simply presumed correct without any opportunity for the alleged combatant to demonstrate
otherwise”).
31
Id. at 533.
32
See id. at 516.
33
Id. at 519 (emphasis added).
34
Id. at 521.
35
See al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 293–97 (4th Cir. 2008) (Wilkinson, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part), vacated as moot sub nom. al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009)
(mem.).
36
See infra Part III.
37
See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516; see also Danner, supra note 27, at 4 (noting that the Hamdi plurality
opinion declined to provide a widely applicable definition of the term).
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“fundamental incident[s] of waging war.”38 In the current habeas litigation,
however, the lower courts have failed to address the principles that should
determine who is an enemy combatant, instead claiming that it is not the
province of the judiciary to draft such a definition, and they have never addressed whether other types of detention are also “fundamental” to war. Instead they have relied on unquestioned analogies and unexplored
assumptions that the post-9/11 habeas cases exist within the traditional confines of war.
B. The Supreme Court’s Post-9/11 Discourse: “Necessity,” “National
Security,” and “War” in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
The Supreme Court has only addressed the merits of the detention of
unlawful enemy combatants one time: in Hamdi. The various opinions of
the Hamdi Court relied on foundational ideas like “national security,” “foreign relations,” and “war” while also emphasizing the radical break of 9/11
and the “necessity” it has created. The foundational terms, or, as I will argue, self-legitimizing énoncés, constitute the basic atoms of Hamdi’s reasoning and the surrounding discourse. The long history of these terms
within the larger discourse concerning the judicial role allows them to dictate institutional power and determine the meaning of the discursive text.
At the same time, there is a clear recognition that 9/11 has ushered in a new
era disconnected from past realities.
Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion in Hamdi began with the phrase
“At this difficult time in our Nation’s history”39 and then opened its recital
of the facts with the familiar “On September 11, 2001 . . . ”40 As Professor
Daniel Williams notes, opening the opinion by invoking the idea of a “difficult time” “establishes the mood of, the backdrop to, the opinion’s analysis”
and “foreshadows that some departure from a legal norm is to take place
and will need to be justified through law.”41 As Williams persuasively argues, the underlying meaning of this opening and the backdrop of the Hamdi opinion as a whole is one of necessity and national security.42 One can
also view this as evidence that the Court perceived 9/11 as an origin that
marks a departure into a new discourse.
Continuing, Justice O’Connor acknowledged that the Court “recognize[s] that the national security underpinnings of the ‘war on terror,’ although crucially important, are broad and malleable.”43 The plurality
opinion restricted itself on the detention issue to deciding the “narrow ques38

Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519.
Id. at 509.
40
Id. at 510.
41
Williams, supra note 15, at 379 (emphasis omitted).
42
See id. at 379–80.
43
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 520 (emphasis added); see also Williams, supra note 15, at 416 (offering an
analysis of this statement in the Hamdi plurality opinion).
39
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tion” of whether the President had the authority to detain “an individual
who . . . was part of or supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners in Afghanistan and who engaged in an armed conflict against
the United States there,”44 clearly limiting the decision to the traditional idea
that an individual participating in hostilities, even a civilian, becomes a
combatant by virtue of this participation.45
When addressing the level of process due to enemy combatants, Justice
O’Connor recognized the “weighty and sensitive governmental interests”46
in keeping combatants from returning to battle and claimed that “[w]ithout
doubt, our Constitution recognizes that core strategic matters of warmaking” should be left to the “politically accountable” branches.47 Although
Justice O’Connor ruled against the Government on Hamdi’s due process
claim, creating a new framework for challenging detention,48 she made sure
to emphasize the traditional deference due to the Executive throughout her
opinion and upheld the power of the Executive to detain unlawful enemy
combatants under the AUMF.
In support of this deference, Justice O’Connor cited Department of the
Navy v. Egan,49 which “not[ed] the reluctance of the courts ‘to intrude upon
the authority of the Executive in military and national security affairs.’”50

44

Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Under the traditional law of war, when civilians directly participate in hostilities, they become
combatants subject to the same treatment as members of an enemy armed force. See NILS MELZER,
INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION
IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 20–26 (2009). Other authorities discuss
further what “active part in the hostilities” has meant historically and internationally in this context. See
HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture v. Israel [2006](2) IsrLR 459, 497–99 (stating that a civilian
who “supports the hostilities against the armed forces in a general matter,” who “sells food or medicines
to unlawful combatants,” or who “helps the unlawful combatants with a general strategic analysis and
grants them general logistic support, including financial support” does not directly participate in hostilities (emphasis added)); U.S. Dep’t of State, Letter of Submittal (July 13, 2000), in PROTOCOLS TO THE
CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, S. TREATY DOC. No. 106-37, at V, VII (2000) (“The United States understands the phrase ‘direct part in hostilities’ to mean immediate and actual action on the
battlefield likely to cause harm to the enemy because there is a direct [causal] relationship between the
activity engaged in and the harm done to the enemy.”); Inter-Am. Comm’n on Human Rights, Third Report
on
Human
Rights
in
Colombia,
ch.
IV.C.2.d,
¶¶ 53
&
56
(1999),
http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/colom99en/chapter.4a.htm (“[C]ivilians whose activities merely support
the adverse party’s war or military effort or otherwise only indirectly participate in hostilities cannot on
these grounds alone be considered combatants. This is because indirect participation, such as selling
goods to one or more of the armed parties, expressing sympathy for the cause of one of the parties or,
even more clearly, failing to act to prevent an incursion by one of the armed parties, does not involve
acts of violence which pose an immediate threat of actual harm to the adverse party.”).
46
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 531.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 528–35 (applying the balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), to
Guantánamo habeas cases).
49
484 U.S. 518 (1988).
50
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 531 (quoting Egan, 484 U.S. at 530).
45
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She also cited Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer51 for the proposition
that military commanders have “broad powers” when “engaged in day-today fighting in a theater of war.”52 These two historical references attempted immediately to establish the role of the judiciary in the case by
simple analogy. However, Justice O’Connor did not investigate why courts
were reluctant to “intrude upon the authority of the Executive” in Egan and
never examined what about the Korean War context of Youngstown necessitated broad executive power. In many ways, then, her opinion is a paradox. If 9/11 has put our country into a “difficult time” and mandated new
approaches, then reliance on historical examples with little relation to the
issue at hand would seem disingenuous. Instead, a more searching excavation of the relationships among these historical examples and of the importance of foundational ideas such as “national security” is necessary.
The other opinions in Hamdi also focused on “national security” and
“war.” In his dissent, Justice Scalia framed the “difficult time” arising out
of 9/11 in his opening paragraph: “This case brings into conflict the competing demands of national security and our citizens’ constitutional right to
personal liberty.”53 Similarly, Justice Thomas, in his dissent, criticized the
plurality for “failing adequately to consider basic principles of the constitutional structure as it relates to national security and foreign affairs.”54 Justice Thomas plainly stated that the plurality erred in conducting a balancing
test related to the government’s “war powers” and that it “utterly fail[ed]”
to take into account the government’s “compelling interests” and the
Court’s own “inability” to weigh competing concerns during wartime.55
Thus, although the various Justices in Hamdi disagreed vehemently on
the proper approach to dealing with the post-9/11 unlawful enemy combatants and the proper separation of powers, all of them made use of preexisting, self-legitimizing unities—including war, national security,
governmental interests—as what Foucault would call the “tranquil locus”56
of their opinions. No Justice questioned whether “national security” had
the same intrinsic meaning in this context as it had in past historical contexts. The Justices did not question exactly what relationships, what power
dynamics, or what exclusions énoncés like “national security” or “foreign
affairs” entailed but instead relied on an unmoving, general understanding
of the terms. Moreover, the Hamdi plurality took the same approach with
the concept, or énoncé, of “war.” Despite the fact that the GWOT is not a

51
52
53
54
55
56

343 U.S. 579 (1952).
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 531 (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587).
Id. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 579 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id.
FOUCAULT, supra note 2, at 26.
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typical war,57 the Court utilized the analogy to traditional war without probing its definition and inherent relations within this specific discourse. Justice O’Connor cited Youngstown, arguably the most famous constitutional
case on the President’s war power, but as this Note argues in Part II, “war”
as used in the Korean War context of Youngstown and “war” after 9/11 may
not have the same inherent meaning because they are situated in different
discourses. The two “wars” are unified only as the same word, or “syntagm.”58 Using Foucault’s insight into discourse, this Note argues that the
meaning of “war,” like other énoncés, is constructed by the various aspects
of the discourse in which it is situated, including the power relationships
that control who defines the word and the inherent historical and linguistic
relationships the word entails. “War” today exists as part of a cohesive
post-9/11 discourse that has formed what Foucault calls a “discursive formation.”
C. Post-9/11 Discourse as a Discursive Formation
An origin is a single point of reference, an ultimate beginning that
frames an entire discourse.59 The concept of an “origin” presupposes links
of causality and continuity, and “masks both the radical discontinuity of
‘emergences’ . . . and the discordances separating different series of discourse or practice.”60 While there are many propositions and ideas within a
discourse that are in fact new emergences, irreducible to any preexisting
formulations, there is only a single origin.61 In the aftermath of 9/11, a discourse has emerged that traces all causality back to that tragic day. The pa-

57

See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, This Is Not a War, 113 YALE L.J. 1871, 1871 (2004) (discussing President Bush’s 2004 State of the Union address in which the President said, “I know that some people
question if America is really in a war at all”); id. at 1872 (“To be sure, the war on terrorism isn’t as obvious a rhetorical stretch as the war on poverty.” (emphasis added)); Joan Fitzpatrick, Jurisdiction of
Military Commissions and the Ambiguous War on Terrorism, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 345, 346–47 (2002)
(describing the post-9/11 “war” as “metaphorical” because a state of war cannot exist between the United States and al Qaeda under international ideas of warfare); Jordan J. Paust, Responding Lawfully to al
Qaeda, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 759, 760–61 (2007) (arguing that the United States cannot, under internationally accepted definitions of war or armed conflicts, be at war with al Qaeda); cf. Williams, supra
note 15, at 398 (“It would take a near Herculean effort, a sustained conscientious commitment to detach
oneself from the incessant chatter of our post-9/11 world about the so-called ‘war on terror,’ to think that
this ‘difficult time’ might mean something different . . . .”).
58
A “syntagm” or “syntagma” is simply a linguistic unit, a collection of linguistic signs, and is used
to connote the actual letters or words without referencing the underlying meaning of the word in any
way. See NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY, supra note 12, at 1762. Its plural is “syntagmata.” Id.
It is necessary to use this linguistic term to differentiate between the énoncé “war,” which includes its
myriad relations to discourse, and the syntagm “war,” which is simply the three-letter word itself, divorced from any relationship to discourse and, thus, divorced from meaning itself.
59
ROGER CHARTIER, ON THE EDGE OF THE CLIFF: HISTORY, LANGUAGE, AND PRACTICES 54 (Lydia
G. Cochrane trans., 1997).
60
Id.
61
See id.
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radox that is the heart of Foucault’s insight, which this Note discusses more
fully in Part II, is that the creation of an origin and a discursive formation
allows self-legitimizing, historical ideas to exist within the discourse as basic, unexamined atoms, or énoncés, of the discourse. Everything within the
discourse relates to this singular origin, but this relation disguises the radical discontinuity between historical concepts and the current discourse.
These inherent relationships have gone unexcavated.
1. Post-9/11 Discourse.—Nine days after the attacks of 9/11, President Bush addressed Congress, saying, “Our enemy is a radical network of
terrorists, and every government that supports them. Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.”62 In
defining the United States’ national security strategy, Administration officials used similar language: “The United States of America is fighting a war
against terrorists of global reach. The enemy is not a single political regime
or person or religion or ideology. The enemy is terrorism . . . .”63 Later, as
the Administration campaigned for the war in Iraq, President Bush said,
“We’re at war. Iraq is part of the war on terror. It is not the war on terror;
it is a theater in the war on terror.”64 After being reelected, President Bush
called Iraq the “latest battlefield” in the war on terror and continued this
theme:
The troops here and across the world are fighting a global war on terror. The
war reached our shores on September 11, 2001. . . . After September 11, 2001,
I told the American people that the road ahead would be difficult and that we
would prevail. Well, it has been difficult and we are prevailing.65

The narratives of both the initiation of the GWOT after 9/11 and the later
Iraq war were woven around the ideology of freedom and Western ideals,66
62

President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress Following 9/11 Attacks (Sept.
20, 2001), http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/gwbush911jointsessionspeech.htm.
63
WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2002), reprinted in AFTER THE WAR IN IRAQ: DEFINING THE NEW STRATEGIC BALANCE 167, 176 (Shai Feldman
ed., 2003).
64
Moon, supra note 18, at 3 (quoting President George W. Bush at a press conference on April 13,
2004).
65
George W. Bush Delivers Remarks to the Nation About Iraq, CQ TRANSCRIPTIONS, June 28, 2005
[hereinafter Bush, Remarks to the Nation], available at 6/29/05 emediapt 00:39:44 (Westlaw).
66
See Williams, supra note 15, at 349–50 (“[F]ormer Assistant Attorney General Viet D. Dinh
claimed that in our fight against terrorism, ‘the tradeoff between security and liberty is a false choice’
because our pursuit of security is defined by a single motivation, the creation of a secure space for liberty to thrive.” (quoting Viet D. Dinh, Harold Leventhal Talk: Ordered Liberty in the Age of International
Terrorism
(June
7,
2002),
available
at
http://www.bancroftassociates.net/
docLeventhalTalk7-7-02.pdf)); Bush, Remarks to the Nation, supra note 65 (“The terrorists who attacked us and the terrorists we face murder in the name of a totalitarian ideology that hates freedom, rejects tolerance and despises all dissent. Their aim is to remake the Middle East in their own grim image
of tyranny and oppression by toppling governments, by driving us out of the region and by exporting
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against the “single enemy, terrorism,”67 thus neatly connecting it all to the
origin of 9/11.
Since taking office, President Obama has emphasized 9/11 as well, in
part to support a heightened war effort in Afghanistan. In his December
2009 speech at West Point announcing that he would send 30,000 more
troops to Afghanistan, President Obama continually referenced the origin of
9/11, noting near the beginning of the speech: “We did not ask for this
fight. On September 11, 2001, 19 men hijacked four airplanes and used
them to murder nearly 3,000 people.”68 In his conclusion, he returned to
this rhetorical theme: “It’s easy to forget that when this war began, we were
united—bound together by the fresh memory of a horrific attack, and by the
determination to defend our homeland and the values we hold dear. . . .
America—we are passing through a time of great trial.”69 Clearly, this
“time of great trial” began on 9/11, and the unity of that day is a continual
reference point for all subsequent military and foreign policy decisions.
2. Foucault’s Idea of Discourse.—“Discourse” has traditionally been
a linguistic term, denoting a group of statements or dialogues that relate to
one another in some way.70 However, as Professor Stuart Hall points out,
Foucault defined discourse as
a group of statements which provide a language for talking about—i.e. a way
of representing—a particular kind of knowledge about a topic. . . . Discourse
is about the production of knowledge through language. But . . . [s]ince all social practices entail meaning, all practices have a discursive aspect. So discourse enters into and influences all social practices.71

As Foucault recognized, discourse “constructs the topic” and bridges—or
rejects—the traditional divide between speech and practice, between language and conduct.72 Thus, Foucault was more interested in the referential
space (référentiel) than in a fixed, permanent object to which a word ostens-

terror. To achieve these aims, they have continued to kill: in Madrid, Istanbul, Jakarta, Casablanca,
Riyadh, Bali and elsewhere. The terrorists believe that free societies are essentially corrupt and decadent and, with a few hard blows, they can force us to retreat. They are mistaken.”).
67
Moon, supra note 18, at 3.
68
President Barack Obama, Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan
(Dec. 1, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-addressnation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan.
69
Id.
70
See, e.g., NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY, supra note 12, at 496 (defining discourse as
“written or spoken communication or debate,” “a formal discussion of a topic in speech or writing,” and
“a connected series of utterances; a text or conversation”).
71
Stuart Hall, The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power, in FORMATIONS OF MODERNITY 275,
291 (Stuart Hall & Bram Gieben eds., 1992).
72
Id.
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ibly refers.73 This referential space contains the rules of possibility for the
term within a particular discourse; it is “that set of historical, practical, and
discursive conditions which account for the existence of the object.”74 Discourses are not linguistic entities that serve to organize knowledge, as the
dictionary defines them, but rather “practices that systematically form the
objects of which they speak.”75 Discourse theory, then, “affirm[s] the discursive character of all social practices and objects” and recognizes that
discourses always construct the exercise of power because they necessarily
construct oppositions and define boundaries.76
Although we traditionally view the author of an opinion or text as determining the meaning of that text, Foucault argued that the reverse often
unconsciously occurs within a discursive formation. The relational space
within the text restricts the author’s authority and is the ultimate fountainhead from which meaning emerges. Foucault was not concerned with the
construction of meaning through language but with the construction of
knowledge and meaning through discourse.77 Foucault attempted to discover “where meaning comes from,”78 an exercise that judges have not been
performing in the post-9/11 context. Undertaking such an analysis is
a task that consists of not . . . treating discourses as groups of signs (signifying
elements referring to contents or representations) but as practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak. Of course, discourses are
composed of signs; but what they do is more than use these signs to designate
things. It is this more that renders them irreducible to the language (langue)
and to speech. It is this ‘more’ that we must reveal and describe.79

Foucault suggested that this “more” is the hidden, relational aspect of discourse that most people overlook. Within a discursive formation, the text,
the “signs” actually construct the meaning of the discourse and determine
the power distribution within it.
3. Post-9/11 Discourse as Discursive Formation.—The post-9/11
discourse is analogous to what Foucault calls a “discursive formation”—a
unity of discourse that shares a system of relations and collateral space. For
Foucault, these shared relations are the provenance of a unified enunciative
field from which text within the discursive formation draws its meaning.
Thus, in the context of 9/11, the relationships between all aspects of the dis73

Michael Mahon, Michel Foucault’s Archaeology, Enlightenment, and Critique, 16 HUM. STUD.
129, 136 (1993).
74
Id.
75
FOUCAULT, supra note 2, at 49.
76
See David Howarth & Yannis Stavrakakis, Introducing Discourse Theory and Political Analysis,
in DISCOURSE THEORY AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS: IDENTITIES, HEGEMONIES AND SOCIAL CHANGE 1, 4
(David Howarth, Aletta J. Norval & Yannis Stavrakakis eds., 2000).
77
Hall, supra note 71, at 73.
78
See id.
79
FOUCAULT, supra note 2, at 49.
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course—terrorism, war, national security—are the radices of a field of possible speech on which judges, scholars, and politicians draw, both consciously and unconsciously. This same enunciative field, however, includes
inherent historical and institutional relations that contribute to the meaning
of the discourse and impose limits on its extent. One can imagine this concept more readily through the example of a book. Although a novel may
appear to be a unified and self-contained whole, it actually contains innumerable relations and connections. As Foucault puts it, “The book is not
simply the object that one holds in one’s hands; and it cannot remain within
the little parallelepiped that contains it: its unity is variable and relative.”80
Thus, although the GWOT may appear to be a unified whole, this unity
must be examined, and the discursive formation must “be regarded in its
raw, neutral state as a collection of [énoncés].”81
Instead of viewing the world as subjective or objective or formed out
of individual consciousness, Foucault posits “a world in which relation is
primary; it is structures that give their objective faces to matter.”82 Thus,
Foucault’s work recognizes that the relational aspects of discourse are not
secondary to meaning but the essential foundations of meaning. Foucault’s
philosophy is relevant to the post-9/11 discussion because it is a “philosophy of relation.”83 First, the post-9/11 discourse is premised on the idea of
9/11 as an origin, a radical disruption in discourse that is the ultimate reference point for a new system of relationships. Almost every case involving
Guantánamo prisoners or other detainees starts with a description of or reference to the 9/11 attacks.84 In Hamdi, Justice O’Connor, writing four years
after 9/11, immediately situated the opinion as arising out of a “difficult
time” and proceeded to describe 9/11. This is not to say that Justice
O’Connor and other judges should not have referenced 9/11; one can barely
imagine them not discussing it. Tracing these issues back to their origin is a
necessary endeavor. Thus, my contention is that a single shared relationship—a single origin—underlies all of the post-9/11 discourse, including
the judicial discourse.
Second, the post-9/11 discourse shares a referential “space in which
various objects emerge and are continuously transformed.”85 A discursive
formation exists when “one can discern and describe one system of dispersion, one type of enunciative distance, one theoretical network, [and] one
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Id. at 23.
SHERIDAN, supra note 5, at 95.
82
CHARTIER, supra note 59, at 70 (emphasis added) (quoting PAUL VEYNE, Foucault révolutionne
l’histoire, in COMMENT ON ÉCRIT L’HISTOIRE SUIVI DE FOUCAULT RÉVOLUTIONNE L’HISTOIRE 201, 236
(1978)).
83
Id. (quoting VEYNE, supra note 82, at 236).
84
See, e.g., supra Part I.B; infra Part III.
85
FOUCAULT, supra note 2, at 32.
81
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field of strategic possibilities.”86 In other words, Foucault wants to describe
the way that one views a science, such as psychology, or a work of art, such
as a novel, as a unified whole, but he wants expand this conception to include the entire “text” of the discourse, including practices and institutional
power relationships.87 Everything relates to the other aspects of this whole
and appears to form an enclosed, cohesive unity. This description perfectly
describes the post-9/11 discourse. As the next Part demonstrates, the issue
of the detention of enemy combatants after 9/11 is embedded in this post9/11 discursive formation. The text of judicial opinions addressing this issue demonstrates agreement on its uniqueness but disagreement over its
implications. Although some judges have recognized the need for the excavation of discourse, most have not.
II. THE JUDICIAL ROLE IN HABEAS LITIGATION POST-BOUMEDIENE
In Boumediene v. Bush,88 the Supreme Court struck down the jurisdiction-stripping provision of the Military Commissions Act of 1996 (MCA).89
This decision removed the jurisdictional bar and called for district court
judges within the D.C. Circuit to hear the merits of the habeas petitions of
the Guantánamo prisoners.90 Although the two parties in Boumediene had
briefed the issue of the President’s power to detain enemy combatants,91 the
Court, as it had in Hamdi, decided not to reach that question, instead leaving “the outer boundaries of war powers undefined”92 and emphasizing that
the “opinion does not address the content of the law that governs petitioners’ detention. That is a matter yet to be determined.”93 The Court explicitly stated that it would “not address whether the President has authority to
detain these petitioners” because “questions regarding the legality of the detention are to be resolved in the first instance by the District Court.”94 The
lower courts were left to interpret the AUMF in the first instance, building
on Hamdi’s narrow holding that an individual captured on a battlefield with
86

CHARTIER, supra note 59, at 57 (quoting Michel Foucault, Réponse au Cercle d’épistémologie,
CAHIERS POUR L’ANALYSE, Summer 1968, at 9, 29).
87
See SHERIDAN, supra note 5, at 93–97 (discussing Foucault’s idea of the discursive formation and
its development).
88
553 U.S. 723, 732–33 (2008) (holding that section 7 of the MCA “operates as an unconstitutional
suspension of the writ [of habeas corpus]”). For more discussion of this case, see infra Part III.
89
28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2006).
90
See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 732–33.
91
Brief for the Boumediene Petitioners at 33–47, Boumediene, 553 U.S. 723 (No. 06-1195).
92
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 797–98. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion did note, however, that the
Court may not be able to take this same approach in future cases that present the issue more pressingly.
Id. (“Because our Nation’s past military conflicts have been of limited duration, it has been possible to
leave the outer boundaries of war powers undefined. If, as some fear, terrorism continues to pose dangerous threats to us for years to come, the Court might not have this luxury.”).
93
Id. at 798.
94
Id. at 733.
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a weapon could be detained as an enemy combatant. Soon after Boumediene, the Fourth Circuit addressed the scope of the AUMF’s authorization
of detention in a petition by a military prisoner held within the United
States. Simultaneously, the habeas petitions of Guantánamo detainees were
addressed by multiple judges within the D.C. district courts, and the D.C.
Circuit eventually decided the detention issue on appeal. Although the
courts all faced the task of interpreting the AUMF, the approaches of the
two circuits were radically different.
A. The Fourth Circuit’s Approach in al-Marri v. Pucciarelli
After the Boumediene decision “cleared the way,” the Fourth Circuit
sitting en banc addressed “the scope of the President’s authority to detain
individuals as enemy combatants”95 in al-Marri v. Pucciarelli.96 The petitioner, an alleged al Qaeda operative, was attending school in the United
States when he was arrested for social security fraud and other allegedly terrorism-related crimes.97 He was subsequently transferred to military custody within the United States and labeled an “enemy combatant.”98
A concurring opinion by Judge Motz (one of seven opinions written by
the nine judges)99 held that the petitioner could not be defined as an enemy
combatant under the historical laws of war and therefore had to be treated
as a civilian.100 The strongly worded opinion argued that sanctioning executive power to detain particular individuals indefinitely under the term “unlawful enemy combatants” “would have disastrous consequences for the
Constitution—and the country” and “would effectively undermine all of the
freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution.”101 This opinion based its analysis directly on the mutually exclusive categories of “civilians” and “combatants” under the traditional law of war102 and on the narrow reasoning of
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Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 50 (D.D.C. 2009).
534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc), vacated as moot sub nom. al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct.
1545 (2009) (mem.).
97
See id. at 219 (Motz, J., concurring in the judgment).
98
Id. at 219–21.
99
The Fourth Circuit struggled with how to characterize the opinions since the four judges who
joined Judge Motz’s concurrence held the detention of the petitioner to be unauthorized but did not
reach the issue on which the case was eventually remanded: the framework by which the petitioner
would be allowed to contest his detention. See id. at 253. Thus, this Note refers to the opinions as concurrences and by the authors’ names to avoid confusion, although Chief Judge Williams and Judge Wilkinson did refer to Judge Motz’s opinion as the plurality. Id. at 293 n.8 (Williams, C.J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); id. at 293 n.1 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
100
See id. at 250–53 (Motz, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 217 (“Even assuming the truth of
the Government’s allegations, they provide no basis for treating al-Marri as an enemy combatant or as
anything other than a civilian.”).
101
Id. at 252.
102
See id. at 233–35.
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Hamdi, which it argued did not unsettle this categorical approach.103 Judge
Motz argued strenuously, and likely correctly, that the end result reached by
the other five judges, albeit by different means, could not be formally
aligned with precedent or with the existing categories in the laws of war.
However, Judge Motz did not recognize the novelty of the énoncés of “war”
and “enemy combatant” within the post-9/11 discursive formation, and she
explicitly rejected Judge Wilkinson’s suggestion that the laws of war may
have evolved.104
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Wilkinson clearly conveyed his conception of the proper judicial approach to the issue at hand and offered an
example of the judicial archaeology for which this Note advocates. He argued that 9/11 has obliged judges to “build a framework for this most dangerous future.”105 Although he echoed the “difficult time” rhetoric
employed by Justices O’Connor and Scalia in Hamdi,106 Judge Wilkinson
also recognized the implications of such radical discontinuity for judicial
action:
This need for some legal framework is not just an opportunity. It is our obligation. . . . A principled framework . . . addresses the limits of executive authority. While a minimalist method has much to commend it in many
circumstances, it has its drawbacks here. This is not an area where ad hoc adjudication provides either guidance or limits, and it leaves the most basic values of our legal system—liberty and security—in limbo.107

Judge Wilkinson worried that a failure to thoroughly investigate the issue of
the Executive’s power to detain would give no notice of the “permissible
boundaries of enemy combatant detentions” and could “inflict[] grave damage to the constitutional fabric at the end that none of us intended at the
start.”108 Thus, although he traced the “most dangerous future” back to the
origin of 9/11, he did not allow the unity of this discursive formation to obscure the need to explore the foundational énoncés on which it rested, such
as “enemy combatant.”
Judge Wilkinson offered an in-depth exploration of the AUMF109 and
the laws of war110 to construct this principled framework. He responded to
the plurality by arguing that the “classical model [of war] is just that: a clas103

See id. at 228–29 (emphasizing the narrowness of Hamdi).
See id. at 245 n.24.
105
See id. at 295 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
106
See id. at 293–96 (noting, among other things, that “we live in an age where thousands of human
beings can be slaughtered by a single action and where large swaths of urban landscape can be leveled in
an instant” and that “[n]uclear devices capable of inflicting enormous casualties can now fit inside a
suitcase or a van”).
107
Id. at 295.
108
Id. at 296.
109
See id. at 297–303.
110
See id. at 315–19.
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sical model. War changes. So too the law of war has not remained static.”111 He directly addressed the precedents of Hamdi, Quirin, and Ex parte
Milligan112 and discussed the intricacies of the law of war to formulate three
criteria by which to determine the legal status of enemy combatants and the
limits of executive power.113 Because his archaeological approach recognized that the “obligation arises not just to ask whether, but why”114 in some
circumstances, Judge Wilkinson attempted to excavate all of the material
relevant to the label “unlawful enemy combatant” and to draft a definition
to guide the political branches in their fight against terrorism. He authoritatively said, “I make no apologies . . . for recognizing that there are constitutional limits on the military detention power and for trying to determine
what they are.”115 It was almost as if he anticipated the criticism of this approach that was forthcoming from the D.C. district courts.
B. The D.C. District Courts’ Restrained Approach
With al-Marri in the background, most of the district court judges
within the D.C. Circuit adopted a much different view of the judicial role
than the Fourth Circuit had, informed to a large degree by the approach of
Judge Leon in Boumediene on remand. Judge Leon, criticizing the approach of Judge Wilkinson and the other Fourth Circuit judges, declined to
give in to what he described as the “temptation . . . to engage in the type of
judicial craftsmanship . . . exhibited . . . in al-Marri.”116 Judge Leon framed
the issue before the court as “what definition of ‘enemy combatant’ should
be employed” and admitted that he would likely “end up somewhere in the
middle” of the extensive briefings on the issue by both sides.117 Despite this
framing, Judge Leon, “on further reflection,” declined to decide the issue.118
Instead, he made the statement that became a clarion call for later judges: “I
do not believe . . . that it is the province of the judiciary to draft definitions.”119 Despite Hamdi’s narrow holding that “force” in the AUMF in111

Id. at 319; see also id. at 293 (“[L]aw must reflect the actual nature of modern warfare. By placing so much emphasis on quaint and outmoded notions of enemy states and demarcated foreign battlefields, the plurality . . . misperceive[s] the nature of our present danger, and, in doing so, miss[es] the
opportunity presented by al-Marri’s case to develop a framework for dealing with new dangers in our
future.”).
112
See id. at 312–29.
113
See id. at 325 (proposing that an “enemy combatant,” by definition, “must (1) be a member of
(2) an organization or nation against whom Congress has declared war or authorized the use of military
force, and (3) knowingly plan[] or engage[] in conduct that harms or aims to harm persons or property
for the purpose of furthering the military goals of the enemy nation or organization”).
114
Id. at 312.
115
Id. at 296.
116
Boumediene v. Bush, 583 F. Supp. 2d 133, 134 (D.D.C. 2008).
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Id.
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Id.
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cluded a particular rationale for detention (preventing the combatant’s return to battle) and its narrow, fact-based holding that an individual caught
with a gun on a battlefield could be considered an enemy combatant, Judge
Leon declined to wrestle with these foundational issues, instead adopting a
definition from the MCA concerning who would be subject to military
commissions.120 Judge Leon then asked whether this congressional definition could be authorized instead of explicating why enemy combatants in
the GWOT could be subjected to detention based on a broad authorization
to use force and what the principles underlying such detention should be.121
Whereas Judge Wilkinson saw sweeping language and the need for constitutional limitations, Judge Leon did not address the constitutional concerns
or excavate the inherent relations in “enemy combatant” and “war.” He
likely adopted this binary approach of “yes” or “no” because the radical
discontinuity of these ideas was obscured by the unity of the post-9/11 discursive formation.
In the first paragraph of Gherebi v. Obama, Judge Walton summarized
the task before him as an attempt to ascertain “whether the President has the
authority to detain individuals as part of its ongoing military campaign . . .
and, if so, what is the scope of that authority.”122 However, he then adopted
the same approach as Judge Leon, restricting himself to a binary “yes” or
“no” decision about whether the petitioners met the government’s proposed
definition, which Judge Walton found justified by the international laws of
war and the AUMF, instead of fulfilling Judge Wilkinson’s obligation to
answer why and provide principles that would actually delineate the scope
of the Executive’s statutory and constitutional authority.123 The opinion’s

120

Id.
Id. (“It is our limited role to determine whether definitions crafted by either the Executive or the
Legislative branch, or both, are consistent with the President’s authority under the [AUMF], and his war
powers under Article II of the Constitution. And, if the definitions are consistent with the Constitution
and the AUMF, we must interpret the meaning of the definition as it applies to the facts in any given
case.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)); see also id. at 135 (“I will limit any further discussion regarding this definition to deciding any legal issues that arise in interpreting and applying the definition
to the facts in this case.”).
122
609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 45 (D.D.C. 2009). The new Administration had moved for a stay soon after
President Obama’s inauguration to reassess what arguments it would make about the President’s detention power. Id. at 52–53. After this consideration, the Administration slightly altered its detention standard, changing “supporting” to “substantially supported,” but it still argued that the court should take a
minimalistic, fact-bound approach to the issue. See id. at 53 (“However, the government believes that
‘[i]t is neither possible nor advisable . . . to attempt to identify[ ] in the abstract[ ] the precise nature and
degree of “substantial support,” or the precise characteristics of “associated forces.”’ Instead, it opines
that ‘the contours of the “substantial support” and “associated forces” bases of detention will need to be
further developed in their application to concrete facts in individual cases.’ The government recommends that the Court look to ‘various analogues from traditional armed conflicts’ in deciding these individual cases.” (alterations in original) (citations omitted)).
123
Id. at 54 (“For the reasons explained at length below, the Court agrees with the government that
the AUMF functions as an independent basis in domestic law for the President’s asserted detention au121
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extensive background section began by invoking that familiar origin, “On
September 11, 2001 . . . ” and then recounted that “nineteen individuals affiliated with the Sunni extremist movement known as al-Qaeda hijacked
four commercial passenger jet airliners in a coordinated terrorist attack
against this country.”124 Following this beginning, the opinion proceeded to
describe each individual target of the 9/11 attacks and Congress’s subsequent passage of the AUMF.125 Judge Walton also earnestly noted that
“remnants of the Taliban regime still wield influence” in Afghanistan and
Pakistan and that many al Qaeda leaders, including Osama bin Laden, remained at large, albeit operating “with a diminished capacity.”126
Judge Bates’s influential opinion in Hamlily v. Obama127 appeared at
first to take a different approach, beginning with the history of enemy combatants instead of the origin of 9/11. Rather than describing the attacks and
their aftermath, Judge Bates began by explaining that, “On March 13,
2009, . . . the government submitted a refinement of its position with respect to its authority to detain those individuals being held at Guantanamo.”128 The entire background section of this opinion, even the footnotes,
discussed the evolving definitions of “enemy combatants” and the scope of
the Executive’s detention power from Hamdi to the present and offered an
exhaustive and impressive discussion of international law.129 However, the
analysis section began with a “premise recently articulated by another judge
of this Court: ‘I do not believe . . . that it is the province of the judiciary to
draft definitions.’”130 In light of this premise, Judge Bates defined his “limited role,” quoting Judge Leon, as “to determine whether definitions
crafted by either the Executive or the Legislative branch, or both, are consistent with the President’s authority under the [AUMF].”131 According to
Judge Bates, this approach was “appropriate, if not required, given the singular role of the Executive in matters of foreign affairs and the deference
that he is customarily given by courts when resolving matters in that

thority, and adopts the basic framework advanced by the government for determining whether an individual is subject to that authority.” (emphasis added)).
124
Id. at 46.
125
Id.
126
Id. As support for this claim, Judge Walton cited a journal article that concluded that “[m]uch of
[al Qaeda’s] original leadership has been brought to justice in one way or another.” Id. (first alteration
in original) (quoting Michael Chertoff, Tools Against Terror: All of the Above, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 219, 219–21 (2009)).
127
616 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. 2009).
128
Id. at 67.
129
See id. at 67–68.
130
Id. at 68 (alterations in original) (quoting Boumediene v. Bush, 583 F. Supp. 2d 133, 134
(D.D.C. 2008)) (calling this statement “[a] starting point for the analysis of this issue”).
131
Id. at 68–69 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Boumediene, 583 F. Supp. at 134)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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realm.”132 Of course, Judge Bates never examined whether, why, or how
the foundational principles (the “plinths”) underlying this “singular role” in
past understandings of “foreign affairs” applied in the GWOT.
In so doing, Judge Bates adopted not only an approach that limited the
voice of the judiciary but also one that silenced the voices of the habeas petitioners. The petitioners had contended that the government was adopting
“new detention standards by ‘analogy to’ the law of war,”133 and Judge
Bates had the opportunity to engage in the iterative process of exploring
these analogies and defining principles. Judges often draw on the voice and
speech of litigants to derive and hone principles through the adversarial
process, but Judge Bates accepted Judge Walton’s exploration of the traditional categories of the law of war and refrained from engaging in an excavation of the analogy.134 Although Judge Bates did eventually determine
that one aspect of the government’s definition did not comport with the traditional law of war,135 he never addressed possible constitutional limitations
or excavated the concept of “enemy combatant” as it existed within the
post-9/11 discourse. He followed the binary approach of saying “yes” to
part of the government’s definition and “no” to the other without really exploring the why, i.e., the animating principles, of the definition itself.
Similarly, in setting forth the scope of the government’s detention
power that would govern the merits of the case, Chief Judge Lamberth in
Mattan v. Obama noted that “[t]he Court’s role here is not to fashion its
own framework, but only to determine whether respondents’ proposed
framework is, as respondents claim, consistent with domestic law and the
laws of war.”136 As support for this proposition concerning the role of the
judiciary, he cited the Government’s brief, which claimed that its detention
power was based on the AUMF and informed by the historical categories of
the laws of war, as well as Judge Leon’s claim that it is not the “province”
of the judiciary to draft definitions.137
Two months later, in July 2009, Judge Kollar-Kotelly addressed another habeas petition on the merits.138 Although she did not cite Judge Leon’s
statement or Mattan’s rephrasing of it, she framed the issue as whether the
petitioner was “lawfully detained in the context of the following standard,”
and the standard she quoted was a near-verbatim recounting of the government’s definition, omitting only the “substantial support” provisions that
Judge Bates had rejected in Hamlily.139 In September 2009, Judge Hogan,
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139

Id. at 69.
Id. at 68 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See id. at 69.
See id.
618 F. Supp. 2d 24, 26 (D.D.C. 2009).
See id.
See Al Mutairi v. United States, 644 F. Supp. 2d 78 (D.D.C. 2009).
See id. at 85 & nn.5–6.
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addressing a dispute over the framework that would guide the court’s inquiry in a similar habeas petition, quoted both Chief Judge Lamberth’s
statement that the court’s only role is to “determine whether respondents’
proposed framework is, as respondents claim, consistent with domestic law
and the laws of war”140 and Judge Leon’s assertion that it is not the role of
the judiciary “to draft definitions.”141
Thus, despite the recognition of the existence of “unresolved questions
about the scope of the government’s detention authority”142 and the recognition that the Supreme Court has “provided ‘scant guidance’ as to whom [the
President] may lawfully detain,”143 courts have continued to follow the binary approach of Judge Leon by adopting the government’s proposed definition of “enemy combatant” and asking whether it is authorized by the
AUMF without addressing constitutional objections to or the nuances of
“enemy combatant.” The district courts have declined to excavate the
foundations of the concepts, such as war and national security, on which
they have relied, and they have refused to construct a framework as Judge
Wilkinson did. Although the Hamdi and Boumediene Courts appeared to
envision the lower courts defining the limits of executive power and erecting constitutional principles to inform their application,144 the district courts
instead confined themselves to “yes” or “no” answers to the question of
whether. Only Gherebi investigated the “longstanding law-of-war principles”145 in any significant way, but it did so only to essentially say “no” to
the petitioner’s arguments.146 This lack of excavation represents silence on
the part of the courts and also silences the contributions of the petitioners
and their attorneys. Were the courts to engage in creating a principled
framework, they would benefit from each petitioner picking up on these legal principles, testing them, and invoking them in slightly different factual
situations.147 Neither Judge Walton nor any of the other judges attempted to
excavate the discourse and construct an affirmative framework.

140

Anam v. Obama, 653 F. Supp. 2d 62, 63 (D.D.C. 2009) (emphasis added) (quoting Mattan, 618
F. Supp. 2d at 26) (internal quotation mark omitted).
141
Id. (quoting Boumediene v. Bush, 583 F. Supp. 2d 133, 134 (D.D.C. 2008)).
142
Abdah v. Obama, 708 F. Supp. 2d 9, 13 n.2 (D.D.C. 2010).
143
Id. at 12 (quoting Al-Bihani v. Obama (Al-Bihani I), 590 F.3d 866, 870 (D.C. Cir. 2010)).
144
See supra text accompanying notes 42–55, 90–94.
145
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004).
146
Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 55–71 (D.D.C. 2009).
147
See Justin Florence, Substantive Detention Law Matters: The Big Questions About Guantanamo
the Supreme Court Should Answer, HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. ONLINE 7 (2008),
http://hlpronline.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/Florence_Substantive_Detention_Law.pdf
(arguing that the Supreme Court in Boumediene should provide a framework outlining the substantive
law of detention so that detainees can develop a legal strategy).
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C. The D.C. Circuit Speaks
Against this backdrop, a panel of the D.C. Circuit addressed the postBoumediene habeas litigation for the first time in Al-Bihani v. Obama.148 At
the outset of its analysis, the panel recognized that the case presented an
overarching question concerning the detention of Guantánamo detainees.
Instead of framing the issue as an analysis of the President’s detention power, the court stated only that its first issue “concerns whom the President
can lawfully detain.”149 Although the distinction may simply be semantic,
this phrasing seems to approach the question more indirectly than flatly asking “whom the President can lawfully detain.” The second phrasing implies
crafting a definition, while the first only concerns such a definition. The
majority opinion concluded its introduction by stating its purpose: “In this
decision, we aim to narrow the legal uncertainty that clouds military detention.”150 Thus, from the beginning the court admitted that it would not attempt to clarify the law or even try to eliminate the uncertainty but would
only “narrow” the confusion. Instead of conducting the archaeological excavation for which this Note advocates, the court relied on the formal, selflegitimizing énoncés of the post-9/11 discourse.
Surprisingly, the majority opinion departed from Hamdi’s statement,
honored at length by Gherebi and the other D.C. district court opinions that
the laws of war inform at least some aspects of the detention power under
the AUMF.151 In Hamdi, Justice O’Connor had found that the law of war
allowed detention, at least for the “duration of the particular conflict,”152 and
though she did not clearly hold that the laws of war limited the President’s
detention power under the AUMF,153 she clearly did give them some weight
in her interpretation.154 The court emphatically stated that there is “no indication . . . that Congress intended the international laws of war to act as extra-textual limiting principles for the President’s war powers under the
148

Al-Bihani I, 590 F.3d 866.
Id. at 870 (emphasis added).
150
Id.
151
See id. at 885 (Williams, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (noting that the
majority’s approach “appears hard to square with the approach that the Supreme Court took in Hamdi”).
152
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004).
153
See Al-Bihani v. Obama (Al-Bihani II), 619 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (“Hamdi never stated that the AUMF incorporates judicially enforceable international-law limits on the President’s authority, which of course would have been a
momentous and unprecedented holding.”); id. at 43 (“Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion in Hamdi
carefully avoided stating that any action contrary to international-law norms would not be authorized
under the AUMF.”).
154
See id. at 43 (noting the difficulty in interpreting Justice O’Connor’s “isolated references” to international law); id. at 54–55 (Williams, J., commenting on the denial of rehearing en banc) (distinguishing between international law as domestic law that limits Executive detention and international law as
normative law that guides a court’s interpretation and arguing that Hamdi “use[d] international law as an
interpretive tool”).
149
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AUMF.”155 As added support, the opinion noted that Congress has not implemented the law of war domestically and cited the Third Restatement of
Foreign Relations.156 Furthermore, the court refused to “quibble” over vague treaties and amorphous customary international law because these laws
of war lacked the “controlling legal force and firm definition” that are necessary when “courts seek to determine the limits of the President’s war
powers.”157 In other words, the majority opinion seemed to say that the judiciary must have a firm definition from an outside source and cannot excavate the numerous historical and contemporary sources on both
international and domestic law to draft an appropriate definition itself.158
Thus, the panel implied that it viewed the case as a vehicle to define the
limits of the President’s power, but it later retreated, finding “no occasion
here to explore the outer bounds”159 of the definition of an unlawful enemy
combatant.
Although it may have been correct in its assertion that international law
did not limit the interpretation of the AUMF,160 the lack of some other law
forcing the court to consider extratextual limits would not necessarily imply

155

Al-Bihani I, 590 F.3d at 871.
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 111(3)–(4) (1987)).
157
See id. (emphasis added).
158
For an argument that the D.C. Circuit ignores precedent establishing a responsibility to interpret
international law that the Supreme Court has recognized since it set out an appendix to guide the capture
of prize cases, see John Dehn, The Relevance of International Law to (the Substantive and Procedural
Rules of) Preventive Detention in Armed Conflict—A Rejoinder to Al-Bihani, OPINIO JURIS (Jan. 29,
2010, 8:37 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2010/01/29/the-relevance-of-international-law-to-the-substantiveand-procedural-rules-of-preventive-detention-in-armed-conflict-–-a-rejoinder-to-al-bihani (“The Court
[has] provided, in what might be viewed as in part an advisory opinion on the law and in part a promulgation of rules of procedure, . . . a heavily referenced mini-treatise . . . of the international[ ]rules governing prize practice, including substantive rules, evidentiary standards and modes of proof. The panel
opinion in al-Bihani both embraces and ignores this tradition.”). See also Al-Bihani II, 619 F.3d at 54
(Williams, J., commenting on the denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing that Hamdi followed a long and
accepted history of using international law to interpret a statute even if the international law does not
have binding force).
159
Al-Bihani I, 590 F.3d at 874.
160
I call this an assertion because, in the denial of rehearing, seven judges signed a joint statement
denying rehearing because they found that the international law aspect of the panel’s decision was not a
holding, but merely dicta. Al-Bihani II, 619 F.3d at 1 (Sentelle, C.J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (“We decline to en banc this case to determine the role of international law-of-war principles in interpreting the AUMF because, as the various opinions issued in the case indicate, the panel’s
discussion of that question is not necessary to the disposition of the merits.”); see Al-Bihani I, 590 F.3d
at 885–86 (Williams, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (calling the international law
aspect of the majority opinion dicta). However, the author of the Al-Bihani I panel decision, Judge
Brown, disagreed with this characterization and argued that this aspect of the opinion was an alternative
holding that enjoyed precedential effect. As such, she called the contrary characterization in the joint
statement of the other judges a “cryptic statement that exhibits no apparent function other than to mystify.” Al-Bihani II, 619 F.3d at 2 (Brown, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc).
156
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that courts should refrain from interpreting an extremely broad statute161 in
order to give it some definition. As Judge Wilkinson recognized, the interpretation of “enemy combatant” is of crucial importance to give notice to
Congress and the Executive in their conduct of future hostilities. Although
the D.C. Circuit implied it was seeking to “determine the limits,” one may
question whether an occasion do so will ever arise under a judicial approach
that only engages in such interpretation if forced to do so. Furthermore, the
Supreme Court explicitly charged the lower courts with defining the “permissible bounds” of the “enemy combatant” label.162 The Court likely recognized that avoidance in the lower courts leads to a less robust body of
lower court law to mine for an ideal rule.163
The petitioner in Al-Bihani also argued, somewhat unpersuasively, that
his ongoing detention was unjustifiable because the hostilities in which he
had allegedly participated had technically ended.164 In response, the majority opinion emphasized that the determination that hostilities have ceased is
a political question on which a court should “defer to the Executive’s opinion.”165 As support for this proposition, the court cited Ludecke v. Watkins,
which asked whether the Alien Enemy Act permitted the President to detain
a German citizen in 1948 after the actual fighting of World War II had
ended.166 The Ludecke Court noted that the termination of a “state of war”
with another country is a political question, as it involved “foreign policy”
and “national security.”167 The Al-Bihani majority failed to mention, however, that the Ludecke Court explicitly distinguished the political determination that a “state of war” had ended from the question of whether active
hostilities had ceased.168 Although a determination of when hostilities end
may also be a determination for which deference is due the Executive, for
either constitutional or pragmatic reasons, the point is that the majority panel failed to discuss the differences between the historical, formal idea of a
“state of war” and the hostilities that are part of this new kind of “war.”
161

See al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 297–98 (2008) (en banc) (Wilkinson, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (noting the broad power the AUMF gives the President), vacated as moot sub
nom. al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009) (mem.).
162
See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 522 n.1 (2004).
163
See Michael S. Catlett, Note, Clearly Not Established: Decisional Law and the Qualified Immunity Doctrine, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 1031, 1051 (2005) (“Sometimes a legal issue is better fleshed out
when it is considered by multiple judges with differing viewpoints. . . . ‘The many circuit courts act as
the “laboratories” of new or refined legal principles . . . providing the Supreme Court with a wide array
of approaches to legal issues and thus, hopefully, with the raw material from which to fashion better
judgments.’” (quoting J. Clifford Wallace, The Nature and Extent of Intercircuit Conflicts: A Solution
Needed for a Mountain or a Molehill?, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 913, 929 (1983))).
164
See Al-Bihani I, 590 F.3d at 871.
165
Id. at 874.
166
Id.
167
Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 168–69, 170 & n.15 (1948) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
168
See id. at 166–70 & n.10.
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Remarkably, as Judge Williams’s concurrence noted, the Al-Bihani court
had no reason to reach the question of what deference was due to the Executive’s assertion that hostilities had not ended.169 Based on common
sense and on the international laws of war, which were discussed extensively in the parties’ briefs,170 the hostilities in Afghanistan were still ongoing.
Although the court found no occasion to address the limits of the President’s power, it seemed to endeavor mightily to highlight the deference the
judiciary should adopt when approaching such matters. The panel likely
felt so constrained because of the “wide deference the judiciary is obliged to
give . . . with regard to questions concerning national security.”171
Judge Brown’s concurrence epitomizes the passive approach some
members of the judiciary have taken in the post-Boumediene line of cases.
Calling it “fortunate” that the case did not require the court “to demarcate
the law’s full substantive and procedural dimensions,” she essentially
pleaded for Congress to legislate on the matter.172 Her concurrence questioned whether a court-driven process is appropriate where the “cases
present hard questions and hard choices, ones best faced directly.”173 The
underlying assumption of her argument, then, was that the judiciary should
not face such questions directly, neither as a tenet of political theory nor as
one of judicial ability. She emphasized that the “legal issues presented by
our nation’s fight with this enemy have been numerous, difficult, and to a
large extent novel,”174 thus making this difficult time “particularly ripe for
Congress to intervene.”175 Echoing the recurring theme that 9/11 is the origin of a new era, Judge Brown concluded with the recognition that “[t]his
war has placed us not just at, but already past the leading edge of a new and
frightening paradigm, one that demands new rules be written.”176 Thus,
even though she realized that war is a challenge to law and that “old wineskins” and “prior frameworks” were “ill-suited to the bitter wine of this new
warfare,”177 for her this realization meant that the judiciary was helpless and
its hands were tied.
Like Judge Leon in Boumediene, Judge Brown appeared to believe that
the judiciary should not or cannot itself adapt existing precedents and old
169

See Al-Bihani I, 590 F.3d at 882–83 (Williams, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (maintaining that the “petitioner’s detention is legally permissible by virtue of facts that he
himself has conceded” so that the majority had no reason to reach the procedural questions of due
process).
170
See Brief for Appellees at 21–52, Al-Bihani I, 590 F.3d 866 (No. 09-5051); see also Al-Bihani I,
590 F.3d at 874 (majority opinion) (noting the petitioner’s reliance on the laws of war).
171
Al-Bihani I, 590 F.3d at 875 (emphasis added).
172
See id. at 881–82 (Brown, J., concurring).
173
Id. at 882.
174
Id.
175
Id.
176
Id.
177
Id.
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wineskins to new situations. Rather, the judiciary should passively say
“yes” or “no” to government definitions. Perhaps she was drawing heavily
on the legal process school of thinking, which argues that in times of war or
other crises the judiciary should defer to any act passed by both political
branches178 or other arguments based on deference to expert agencies.179
Later in the denial of rehearing, however, she clearly rejected any notion
that the court was giving deference to the Executive’s interpretation of the
AUMF because the Obama Administration had argued that international
law did play a role in its interpretation.180 In her original concurrence, she
did not cite any of the scholarship on the rationale underlying deference and
offered no archaeological defense of this deference but instead relied solely
on the applicability of past analogies. However, like Judge Wilkinson, she
clearly realized that 9/11 had ushered in a “new and frightening paradigm”
and that the post-9/11 habeas litigation demanded “new rules,” implicitly
recognizing the radical discontinuity created by 9/11. She perceived this
novelty only as a demand on Congress, though, and not as a judicial obligation.
Judge Brown’s concurrence may be the best example of the way that
the post-9/11 discursive formation has shaped the role of the judiciary. Although one could disagree with her ideology or legal conclusions, the operation driving these opinions and this approach to the judicial task is deeper
than ideology or logical propositions. The discursive formation shapes the
judges’ approaches, which in turn reinforce the inherent institutional arrangements within the discursive formation.181 Foucault’s The Archaeology
178

See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive
Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights During Wartime, 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES
L. 1, 35 (2004) (“This is a democratic-process based view that emphasizes that the judicial role in reviewing assertions of power during exigent circumstances should focus on ensuring whether there has
been bilateral institutional endorsement for the exercise of such powers—rather than a view that the
judicial role should be to determine on its own the substantive content and application of ‘rights’ during
wartime. This is not a view that might please more abstract academic ‘rights theorists,’ be they political
philosophers or constitutional theorists.”).
179
See, e.g., Julian Ku & John Yoo, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Functional Case for Foreign Affairs
Deference to the Executive Branch, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 179, 180, 199–205 (2006) (presenting a functionalist argument for deference to Executive Branch interpretations of laws affecting foreign affairs,
rather than relying solely on the “solid and undisputed formal pedigree” of such deference); Jide Nzelibe, The Uniqueness of Foreign Affairs, 89 IOWA L. REV. 941 (2004) (undertaking a thorough analysis
of institutional advantages in dealing with foreign affairs and identifying categories of issues more
suited to judicial determination and those on which the judiciary should abstain).
180
Al-Bihani II, 619 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Brown, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en
banc) (“Contrary to the government’s claim, its preferred statutory interpretation warrants no deference
from this court.”).
181
See Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the “War on Terror,” 108 COLUM. L. REV.
1013, 1030 (2008) (“Having invited Congress to fix things, for example, the Court has put itself in an
institutionally weaker position to later strike down Congress’s fix on rights-based grounds. Moreover,
having applied the law of war to al Qaeda detainees, the Court has made it difficult to later find that the
‘war on terror’ may not really be a war at all. And the Court has done so without the benefit of fully
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of Knowledge describes the way the text of a discourse actually constructs
its meaning and distributes institutional power, and his insights expose the
way that the post-9/11 discourse has altered the judicial role in these habeas
cases. Instead of conducting a principled, archaeological investigation and
constructing a framework for executive power, judges believe that they are
inherently unable or ill-suited to answer these difficult questions directly.
The unexamined foundations of the discourse—the énoncés—have compelled this approach because their inherent, referential spaces have defined
the meaning of the text and the discourse.
III. THE ÉNONCÉ AND THE POST-9/11 DISCURSIVE FORMATION
Foucault uses the word énoncé in The Archaeology of Knowledge to
represent the basic “atom of discourse”182 and the foundational element of
any discursive formation. Although énoncé is typically translated as
“statement” or “utterance,” Foucault actually uses this French neologism to
avoid any past associations or latent meaning in a word with an already
fixed meaning.183 A sentence, a jumble of letters, or another material enunciation becomes an énoncé through an anterior relation that arises from an
enunciative field of discourse, a discourse limited and ordered according to
a network of interwoven relationships.184 Even images can become énoncés
if they become the historical rules and relationships, the individual units, by
which a unified discursive formation is held together.185 While a name designates an individual and a proposition has a referent, an énoncé has no
correlate:
It is linked rather to a ‘referential’ that is made up not of ‘things’, ‘facts’, ‘realities’, or ‘beings’, but of laws of possibility, rules of existence for the objects
that are named, designated, or described within it and for the relations that are
affirmed or denied in it. The referential of the statement forms the place, the
condition, the field of emergence, the authority to differentiate between individuals or objects, states of things and relations that are brought into play by

considering the substantive or rights-based arguments.”); Sarah L. Lochner, Comment, Qualified Immunity, Constitutional Stagnation, and the Global War on Terror, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 829, 867 (2011)
(“[J]udicial avoidance maneuvers can bind the judiciary to a certain decisional path without a full deliberative process.”).
182
FOUCAULT, supra note 2, at 80.
183
See Deleuze Interview, supra note 4, at 20–21 & n.1.
184
See SHERIDAN, supra note 5, at 100 (discussing the differences between statements (énoncés)
and sentences, propositions, and other enunciations).
185
See ALEC MCHOUL & WENDY GRACE, A FOUCAULT PRIMER: DISCOURSE, POWER AND THE
SUBJECT 37 (1993) (discussing the Latin conjugation of amare as an énoncé, as well as the periodic table and a pricing schedule); J.G. MERQUIOR, FOUCAULT 80–81 (2d ed. 1991) (discussing Foucault’s
conception of the énoncé and giving the example of a taxonomic table or a genealogic tree as possible
énoncés).
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the statement itself; it defines possibilities of appearance and delimitation of
that which gives meaning to the sentence, a value as truth to the proposition.186

Thus, one of the principal insights of Foucault’s Archaeology is its recognition that individual elements within an enclosed discursive formation cannot be analyzed in isolation, separated from the discursive relations they
entail. Two identical linguistic expressions, or syntagmata, spoken or written in different times or in different relational contexts, may be two distinct
énoncés. Foucault offers the simple examples of the claim that the world is
round made before and after Copernicus or the claim that species evolve
made before and after Darwin187: “[I]t is not . . . that the meaning of the
words has changed; what changed was the relation of these affirmations to
other propositions, their conditions of use and reinvestment, the field of experience, of possible verifications, of problems to be resolved, to which
they can be referred.”188 Énoncés, then, are “not . . . fixed components” that
can be grasped; they can only be understood through the rules that govern
their appearance and scope within a discourse.189
While other philosophers before him argued that language cannot be
viewed in isolation from its creation, its author, its unconscious, its history,
and its context,190 Foucault, building on these insights, argues that all of
these relations are present in the text of the discourse itself. He suggested
that the relations of an énoncé to formulations with which it appears, formulations to which it refers, formulations whose subsequent possibility it determines, and formulations that share its status create a “collateral space”
that borders, delineates, and, in turn, helps create the discursive formation.191
A. The Enunciative Field of the Post-9/11 Discursive Formation
For Foucault, “a sequence of linguistic elements is a[n] [énoncé] only
if it is immersed in an enunciative field . . . in which it has a place and a status, which arranges for its possible relations with the past, and which opens
up for it a possible future.”192 The philosopher Gilles Deleuze, writing
186

FOUCAULT, supra note 2, at 91.
Id. at 103.
188
Id.
189
See MCHOUL & GRACE, supra note 185, at 38.
190
See, e.g., JACQUES LACAN, The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis,
in ÉCRITS: A SELECTION 31, 84 (Bruce Fink trans., 2006) (“For the function of language in speech is not
to inform but to evoke.”); ED PLUTH, SIGNIFIERS AND ACTS: FREEDOM IN LACAN’S THEORY OF THE
SUBJECT 29–32 (2007) (discussing Lacan’s separation of Saussure’s “sign” and “signifier” and his emphasis on the relation of language and the unconscious); LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL
INVESTIGATIONS 7, 75, 148 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 2001) (seeking to bring into prominence
the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or a “form of life,” and not simply a representative function).
191
See FOUCAULT, supra note 2, at 97–99.
192
Id. at 99.
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about Foucault’s insights, outlines the three forms of “spaces” that are discursively incorporated in an énoncé: the “collateral space,” which is formed
from other statements that are a part of a discursive formation;193 the “correlative space,” which consists of “certain intrinsic positions” associated
with the statement;194 and the “complementary space,” which consists of
nondiscursive formations, including social practices and the “institutional
milieu.”195 This section demonstrates that these three spaces are all present
within the post-9/11 discursive formation, but judges have barely acknowledged their existence, much less excavated their influence on the discourse,
in the current habeas litigation.
1. Post-9/11 Énoncés and Collateral Space.—Within the post-9/11
discursive formation, one énoncé that has consistently appeared is the idea
of “national security.” Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion in Hamdi and
the multiple opinions in al-Marri emphasized the traditional deference to
the Executive in matters of national security, and most of the habeas cases
in the district courts picked up this idea as well. Judge Brown’s majority
opinion for the D.C. Circuit in Al-Bihani clearly based its deference to the
Executive on the historical idea of national security, noting the “wide deference” due when national security is at issue.196
The collateral space of 9/11 is a vastly different collateral space than
the collateral space in which “national security” has historically been situated, as the references to Egan and Youngstown in Justice O’Connor’s
opinion demonstrate. Similarly, the énoncés of war and unlawful enemy
combatants are now embedded in the collateral space of this post-9/11 discourse, which is distinct from the space delineating the discourse during
Quirin and other wartime contexts. The terrorist activities and structure of
al Qaeda, presidential action in this GWOT, the political and cultural debates surrounding Guantánamo and military trials, and the role that the judiciary has assumed within this discursive formation are all components of
this collateral space that contribute to the référentiel and the enunciative
field that construct the meaning of these terms. Although the Obama Administration has officially dropped the terms “enemy combatants”197 and
“Global War on Terror,”198 the removal of these syntagmata from the offi193

See DELEUZE, supra note 10, at 4–5.
Id. at 6.
195
Id. at 9.
196
See Al-Bihani I, 590 F.3d 866, 875, 878 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
197
See Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 66 n.2 (D.D.C. 2009); Del Quentin Wilber & Peter
Finn, U.S. Retires ‘Enemy Combatant,’ Keeps Broad Right to Detain, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 2009, at
A6.
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See Scott Wilson & Al Kamen, ‘Global War on Terror’ Is Given New Name, WASH. POST (Mar.
25, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/24/AR2009032402818.html
(“In a memo e-mailed this week to Pentagon staff members, the Defense Department’s office of security
review noted that ‘this administration prefers to avoid using the term “Long War” or “Global War on
Terror.” Please use “Overseas Contingency Operation.”’”).
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cial discourse does not entail the extinction of the énoncés within the discursive formation.
For the Obama Administration, the énoncé of “enemy combatant” had
become too unwieldy, too heavily imbued with relations to international
law, Bush Administration policies, Supreme Court cases, and the judicial
system itself. New relations and exclusions had altered the enunciative
field it inhabited and, as a result, altered the locations of its authority and
privilege. Therefore, the Obama Administration, beginning with Hamlily,
simply offered a definition of “those individuals” that may be detained pursuant to the AUMF.199 In other words, as Foucault envisioned, the Obama
Administration altered the language, the syntagmata used, but the énoncé
has survived. The Obama Administration is relying on the same concept,
“those individuals being held at Guantanamo,” without using the words
“enemy combatant.”200 The énoncé is still present in the discourse and continually interacting within the discursive formation.
In the same way, scholars who regard discourse as a creation of individual actors have viewed the post-9/11 discourse as the active creation or
interpretation of the Executive Branch during this period.201 However, Foucault’s conception of a discursive formation does not involve a “subject” or
“author” of a discourse. Although some may characterize the Bush Administration as purposefully having chosen rhetoric and language in order to
carve out more executive power, Foucault “places [at] centre stage . . . [the]
discursive formations.”202 He inverts the traditional perspective of a subject
or source creating knowledge or defining language and instead focuses on
the way the impersonal discourse creates subjects.203 “Discourses and practices . . . are seen as having a dynamic and momentum of their own, through
their principle of organization. It is this dynamic and organization which
becomes the target of study.”204 The collateral space inherent in the post9/11 discourse, then, contributes to the meaning and enunciative field of the
énoncés. Although the statements and policies of Presidents Bush and Obama are obviously a part of this collateral space, so are all of the other elements and relationships within the post-9/11 discursive formation.
“National security,” “war,” and “enemy combatants” cannot be fully understood without unearthing and analyzing all of these relationships.
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See Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 67; see also id. at 73 (“[T]he government no longer seeks to detain petitioners on the basis that they are ‘enemy combatants.’”).
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See, e.g., Jennifer Bond, The Language of War: A Battle of Words at Guantanamo Bay,
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For instance, what does “national security” mean in relation to the idea
of terrorism, arguably another énoncé within the discourse? Despite the
fact that concerns about national security have served as a backdrop to all of
this litigation, the district courts have thus far deemed a particular individual’s threat to national security inapplicable to the analysis of the extent of
detention authorized by the AUMF. After recounting other court decisions,
Judge Hogan held in Anam v. Obama that national security had no impact
on the President’s detention power because “mention of the threat the individual poses to the national security” was “[a]bsent” from the discourse.205
Because the historical, formal idea of executive detention did not include
this consideration and the “conflict ha[d] not ended,” Judge Hogan impotently concluded that “the Court’s hands are tied.”206 Another case echoed
this approach, noting that the “question of whether the petitioner poses a
threat to the United States’ national security is one the district courts have
not found determinative, or even relevant, in ruling on the merits of habeas
petitions.”207 To be sure, this kind of individualized threat to national security is distinct from a more general understanding of the threat posed by terrorism to national security. Arguably, though, the phrase “national
security” has an added dimension when viewed within the post-9/11 discursive formation that includes terrorism, al Qaeda, and radical Islam.208
Courts have refrained from determining whether it does have an added dimension and have refused to recognize the powerful effect the collateral
space of a discursive formation can have.
2. Post-9/11 Énoncés and Correlative Space.—Historical references
and other relationships outside of the post-9/11 discursive formation compose the correlative space that informs these énoncés. The history of the
linguistic syntagm “unlawful enemy combatants” offers insight into the
transformative power of discourse. In Quirin, the “law” root of the word
“unlawful” referred (Foucault might say “related”) to the laws of war as
they applied to soldiers in an enemy force;209 these laws were considered
part of the collateral space within the same discursive formation. Within
the context of the Quirin opinion, by necessity, the term “unlawful” excluded any relation to civil war or other noninternational armed conflict and
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Al-Adahi v. Obama, 698 F. Supp. 2d 48, 53 (D.D.C. 2010).
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explicitly existed only within the discourse of international war, specifically
in relation to World War II. The post-9/11 discursive formation retained
the general relation to war as part of the correlative, historical space but also
incorporated the numerous relations and exclusions already present in the
enunciative field of post-9/11 discourse, i.e. the collateral space composed
of terrorism, national security, al Qaeda, and the rest of the post-9/11 discursive formation. While the term “unlawful enemy combatant” under the
historical understanding necessarily included the category of a lawful combatant as an antithesis, the term within the post-9/11 discursive formation
appears to have no such correlate.
A discursive formation with its specific enunciative field may, despite
the “most manifest semantic, grammatical, or formal identities, define a
threshold beyond which there can be no further equivalence, and the appearance of a new [énoncé] must be recognized.”210 One may argue that
“national security” and “unlawful enemy combatants” before and after 9/11
are identical énoncés, but as this Note argues, no judge has actually made
the effort to determine this identity. Instead, the unity of the linguistic syntagmata is assumed and the terms become self-legitimizing “atom[s] of discourse”211 beyond which no one probes more deeply. Anytime one of these
énoncés appears within the post-9/11 discursive formation, it includes this
historical correlative space, which, in turn, constructs the possibilities of its
meaning.
3. Post-9/11 Énoncés and Complementary Space.—Finally, the
“complementary space” refers to the nondiscursive institutions and practices that also form part of the text of a discursive formation. One of the chief
contributions of Foucault’s methodology, and one of the reasons it is so applicable to the post-9/11 judicial role, is Foucault’s realization that the
words themselves define the power relations, which, in turn, construct the
meaning of a term. The enunciative field includes certain institutional power relationships and the authority to speak, which are influenced, in turn, by
the collateral and correlative spaces. The complementary space determines
who has the power to control the application of an énoncé like “national security” or “unlawful enemy combatant” in practice. Thus this aspect of the
enunciative field sets the rules for who can define the term, contains the
possibilities inherent in the label, and consequently excludes other potential
authorities or possibilities.
For example, the term “unlawful enemy combatant,” based on Quirin
and other precedent, has thus far operated as an unexamined énoncé, an
atom of discourse that has constructed the power relations between the
branches of government. The énoncé imports a historical set of institutional
210

FOUCAULT, supra note 2, at 103; see also DELEUZE, supra note 10, at 7–8 (noting that the “discursive object” of an énoncé is “defined precisely by the limits to the lines of variation”).
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relationships into the discursive formation as part of its complementary
space in the same way it imports discursive relationships as part of its collateral and correlative spaces. The term constructs the institutional relationships between detainees and the government, excludes potential existing
relationships (such as criminal to prosecutor), and ultimately determines
both who has the authority to speak and the limits of such speech.
One such limit inherent in the post-9/11 discursive formation is the exclusion of the criminal discourse. Each discursive formation necessarily entails exclusions of other discourses and other referential fields by its
allocation of power. Although some officials within the Clinton Administrations in the 1990s began to advocate military action against al Qaeda, terrorism was almost universally considered a crime before 9/11.212
Furthermore, the detention and trial of individual terrorists for individual
terrorist acts in the United States and other countries was almost exclusively
handled in the civilian criminal context until 9/11.213 Crime focuses on
conduct, on specific actions, not membership in a military or other group,214
but the detainees in Guantánamo (who cannot be “prisoners” because that
label is excluded by the complementary space of the discursive formation)
are part of or associated with an organization that is the target of U.S. military action. To understand the exclusion one only has to imagine a soldier
who kills an enemy soldier on a battlefield; such a soldier cannot be guilty
of murder because he is only fulfilling the duty of war. There can be no
crime when such an action occurs within the discourse of war.
At least one judge attempted to excavate this exclusion and draw attention to the impact of discourse. After the Court in Rasul v. Bush gave the
lower courts jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions from Guantánamo detai-
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nees,215 detainees began challenging the constitutional adequacy and procedures of the Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) set up by the
Bush Administration. In one such case, In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases,
Judge Green sharply criticized the CSRTs.216 Judge Green held that detainees were entitled to assert due process rights and, therefore, the CSRTs
were subject to review concerning their constitutionality under the Hamdi
model.217 In her opinion, Judge Green also questioned the aspects of the
CSRT enemy combatant definition218 that were associational (an element of
the discourse of war but not crime),219 granting that the detainees had a viable argument that this definition “violates long standing principles of due
process by permitting the detention of individuals based solely on their
membership in anti-American organizations rather than on actual activities
supporting the use of violence or harm against the United States.”220
This same type of exclusion can be seen in the scholarly and political
debate over whether this conflict is an international conflict or a noninternational conflict. Even though the United States overthrew the reigning government of a sovereign nation (Afghanistan) as part of an attack on a
“single enemy, terrorism,” parts of the subsequent conflict have been held
not to be an international conflict, but a noninternational conflict, a category
originally conceptualized in reference to civil war and insurrection.221 Like
215

542 U.S. 466, 470 (2004) (“These two cases present the narrow but important question whether
United States courts lack jurisdiction to consider challenges to the legality of the detention of foreign
nationals captured abroad in connection with hostilities and incarcerated at the Guantanamo Bay Naval
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the construct of unlawful enemy combatant, noninternational armed conflict
has a historical basis and a complex set of relations that belong to a different discourse than the one surrounding 9/11. By asserting that the conflict
was noninternational, the Supreme Court necessarily excluded the voluminous discourse concerning international armed conflict and the treatment of
civilians, prisoners, and combatants. Whether that entire discourse is relevant or not is debatable, but the Court should at least address the fact that
the unique GWOT may not fit neatly into historical categories. The Court
should excavate the preexisting discursive relationships and exclusions that
these imperfect analogies import into the current controversies and determine transparently whether such relationships and exclusions are appropriate.
B. The Discursive Formation as the Allocation of Power and Authority
This Note’s argument is not that harnessing aspects of imperfect analogies is not proper. Instead, it seeks to point out that the discursive formation, which is composed of énoncés and all of the referential space
embedded in them, constructs the ways in which these analogies may be interpreted and determines who has the authority to make such interpretations. Within the post-9/11 discourse, as exemplified in the postBoumediene habeas litigation in the D.C. district courts, judges have occupied a constrained role, asking whether instead of undertaking the obligation to answer why that Judge Wilkinson perceived. A limited role for the
judiciary may be the proper approach in this new kind of war, but courts
have not excavated the discourse and made this argument. They have instead relied on unexamined énoncés and historical analogies.
The exclusions and collateral, correlative, and complementary spaces
of the énoncés of the post-9/11 discursive formation have constructed institutional power relationships, instead of the other way around. Judge Leon’s
resistance to the temptation of the “judicial craftsmanship” “exhibited” by
the Fourth Circuit in al-Marri and his statement that the province of the judiciary does not allow it to draft definitions222 is appealing at first because it
seems to posit the proper role of the judiciary as the interpreter, but not the
drafter, of law. His statement also appears on its face to echo the tradition
of deference to the Executive Branch in matters of foreign policy and during wartime.223 Probably for these reasons, this apparently innocuous, unthe conflict was international in scope. Id. (“Common Article 3 applies only to armed conflicts confined
to ‘a single country.’” (quoting INT’L COMM. RED CROSS, COMMENTARY: III GENEVA CONVENTION
RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 37 (1960))).
222
See supra Part II.B.
223
See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE
L.J. 1170 (2007) (detailing the history of judicial deference to the Executive in matters of foreign relations and arguing that, in some circumstances, the judiciary should treat executive interpretations of statutes with the same deference with which it examines administrative interpretations under Chevron).
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controversial statement has been explicitly asserted or implicitly accepted
as the basis for almost all decisions in the habeas litigation within the D.C.
Circuit following Boumediene.224
For example, the Constitution explicitly bestows upon Congress the
power to “define and punish . . . Offences against the law of nations,”225 but
in a discursive formation that has excluded single offenses or acts from its
purview in its focus on association and war, the detention (not punishment)
of detainees (not prisoners) does not implicate this doctrine. Although the
definition of “unlawful enemy combatants” and thus the legal standard for
detention proposed by the Executive Branch borrowed explicitly from a statute making it a crime to materially support terrorism,226 the discursive formation does not allow both the criminal and military to coexist; it excludes
the idea of “crime” in the unity of “war.” Courts could argue that the
AUMF is a proper delegation of power even if they accepted that the definition of an enemy combatant is essentially the definition of someone who
commits the crime of terrorism, but they have not conducted such an excavation of the unlawful enemy combatant énoncé.
Informed by Foucault’s methodology, this Note argues that Judge Leon
and many other members of the judiciary are speaking from a role constructed by the discursive formation itself. The text of the discursive formation determines the meanings of and inherent relationships among terms
such as “war” or “enemy combatant” and, consequently, the role of the judiciary in analyzing questions involving those terms. As Foucault explains,
“Such discourses as economics, medicine, grammar, the science of living
beings give rise to certain organizations of concepts, certain regroupings of
objects, certain types of enunciation, which form, according to their degree
of coherence, rigour, and stability, themes or theories . . . .”227 The themes
and theories of the post-9/11 discursive formation, then, define where the
power and authority of speech lie and what categories of speech are even
possible.
Foucault’s insights demonstrate that “[p]ower develops through ‘normalization’, through defining what is usual and habitual and to be expected,
as opposed to the deviant and exceptional.”228 The discursive formation that
has developed after 9/11 postulates the attacks of that day as the origin, as a
break with all previous discourses and the cause of all that has followed, but
it also includes numerous historical unities that distribute power relationships according to their normative content. The GWOT is a new kind of
war, calling for new kinds of warfare, but it still includes within it the historical unity of “war.” “Unlawful enemy combatants” are a new type of
224
225
226
227
228
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enemy that require new measures, but this label has existed since Quirin
and continues to contain its relationships to its historical antecedent and its
referential space. In this way, the discursive formation has employed historical discourses, each with a complex referential space that “is defined by
the rules of formation and transformation of the mobile and multiple objects
that those discourses construct and posit as their referents.”229 Therefore,
instead of focusing on the radical discontinuity of the emergence of post9/11 unlawful enemy combatants, courts have felt bound by the historical
rules of the label’s formation and definition. Similarly, since 9/11 is seen as
reconstituting all discourses, “terrorism,” which was previously located in
the criminal discourse and accompanied by rules excluding it from the discourse of war,230 has now been reconceptualized and incorporated into an
entirely different discursive formation. These discursive interrelationships
have gone unexplored and unaccounted for in judicial opinions. Thus, the
problem that this Note finds with the approach of many courts considering
habeas petitions after Boumediene is the same problem confronted by Foucault, and this Note calls for the same solution: archaeology.
IV. AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE POST-9/11 DISCURSIVE FORMATION
Judges should engage in archaeological methodology when deciding
fundamental questions about the separation of powers and the applicability
of old precedents to this “difficult time.” The archaeology described below
is necessary because énoncés are not immediately perceptible but are typically hidden among the phrases and propositions of a discourse. Therefore,
the courts rely on these self-legitimizing foundational terms and concepts
without actually exploring whether they are, in fact, new emergences within
the post-9/11 discursive formation. The plinth, the base supporting a statute
or column, must be unearthed and “polished—even fashioned or invented.”231 One of the principal reasons Foucault advocates this archaeology is his desire to focus on the radical discontinuity of emergences instead
of situating them within a larger historical narrative. At the same time,
Foucault seeks to eliminate the idea that “historical development . . . is organized like a necessary continuity; that events are linked together, the one
engendering the other in an uninterrupted flow that permits decreeing one
the ‘cause’ or ‘origin’ of the other.”232
In law, then, Foucault’s insight and proposed methodology are extraordinarily valuable because they force a judge to wrestle with the way that
words and concepts shift depending on their discursive relations. Not only
is this archaeological excavation of discourse a valuable practice in and of
229
230
231
232
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itself, but it also provides the full blueprint of the structure of argumentation
so that another judge who disagrees can respond on a more fundamental
level. For example, in the Fourth Amendment context, the Supreme Court
relied on the historical ability of police officers to make warrantless arrests
of individuals who commit felonies to uphold the constitutionality of an arrest in United States v. Watson.233 In dissent, Justice Marshall pointed out
that “felony” as the majority used it included a much wider swath of crimes
than it had historically, and he argued that the majority opinion had thus
failed to be faithful to historical practice.234 He was asserting that although
the syntagm of “felony” remained the same, the énoncé of “felony” constituted something far different in the current discourse than it had historically. Had the majority recognized this discursive point as well, it would have
been forced to present an archaeological argument that “felony” as used today should be treated in the same way that “felony” has been treated historically. In the same way, the post-9/11 habeas cases present judges with the
opportunity to engage in such an archaeological excavation with the post9/11 énoncés. In so doing, the courts would provide a principled framework, built upon the plinths underlying the discourse, with which others
could disagree on the same fundamental level.
In the cases outlined above, some courts have approached the historical
development since 9/11 as a necessary continuum, each development built
upon a prior event and existing within a self-enclosed discourse. Many of
the opinions start with 9/11 as both the origin and ultimate cause of each
subsequent event. “On September 11, 2001,” the world changed unalterably and nothing can be viewed except in its relation to 9/11. Foucault’s discussion of the place of the French Revolution within the discourse of the
Enlightenment could easily be mistaken for one about 9/11:
The idea of a single break suddenly, at a given moment, dividing all discursive formations, interrupting them in a single moment and reconstituting them
in accordance with the same rules—such an idea cannot be sustained.
....
. . . [T]he French Revolution . . . does not play the role of an event exterior
to discourse, whose divisive effect one is under some kind of obligation to discover in all discourses; it functions as a complex, articulated, describable
group of transformations that left a number of positivities intact, fixed for a

233

423 U.S. 411, 418 (1976) (“The cases construing the Fourth Amendment thus reflect the ancient
common-law rule that a peace officer was permitted to arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor or
felony committed in his presence as well as for a felony not committed in his presence if there was reasonable ground for making the arrest.”).
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Id. at 441–42 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[T]he only clear lesson of history is contrary to the one
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number of others rules that are still with us, and also established positivities
that have recently disappeared or are still disappearing before our eyes.235

The tragedy of 9/11 has created a “sudden break” in all discourses, a fact
recognized by many judges in the judicial discourse. However, the event is
not “exterior” to the preexisting discourses so that it has had no influence
over their underlying meaning. The discursive formation that has resulted
presumes that many previously existing legal constructs have been “left intact” without addressing the question of why. As Foucault says of the
French Revolution, the proposition that 9/11 occurred and interrupted everything only to put everything back in “accordance with the same rules”
cannot be sustained. In ushering in this “difficult time,” 9/11 has also established a new discursive formation, with new rules, new énoncés, and a
new référentiel consisting of its own collateral, correlative, and complementary spaces.
However, the plinths of the post-9/11 judicial discourse—such terms as
“national security,” “war,” and “enemy combatants”—are being used regularly by judges who either do not see the interrelationships within the discursive formation that have reconstructed their meaning or feel powerless to
address them. Instead of acknowledging the radical discontinuity between
the historic use of these terms and their use within the post-9/11 discursive
formation, or even recognizing the possibility of such a discontinuity, most
judges have relied on their unity.
Judges can only understand the construction of the definitions and
power relationships and determine who has the authority to “speak,” i.e. to
draft definitions, by unearthing these énoncés and exploring their relational
spaces. Thus, judges must attempt to excavate the plinths of this post-9/11
discursive formation. An understanding of this discursive construction is
necessary to form new principles, or plinths, upon which to base a decision
about fundamental questions of the separation of powers and international
law in the post-9/11 world. Therefore, judges should excavate the discursive formation and then, by means of what Foucault termed “controlled decisions,” address the why of the foundational elements and institutional
relationships of the discursive formation.
A. Drafting the Definitions by a Series of “Controlled Decisions”
Archaeology studies “human history . . . through the excavation of
sites and the analysis of artifacts and other physical remains”236 and constructs a picture of past culture from these basic remnants. Foucault chose
this analogy to describe his discursive methodology and defined his version
of archaeology:
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What, in short, we wish to do is to dispense with ‘things’. To ‘depresentify’
them. . . . To substitute for the enigmatic treasure of ‘things’ anterior to discourse, the regular formation of objects that emerge only in discourse. To define these objects without reference to the ground, the foundation of things, but
by relating them to the body of rules that enable them to form as objects of a
discourse and thus constitute the conditions of their historical appearance.237

Thus, to escape the inertia of the post-9/11 discursive formation, the judiciary must define its role and the constitutional principles that define it
without reference to the “foundation,” i.e. self-legitimizing énoncés such as
“war” and “foreign relations.” In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, Justice O’Connor
cited Youngstown and Egan for the proposition that the Judicial Branch has
historically deferred to the Executive in matters of national security and
foreign relations,238 but she did not relate these assertions to the “conditions
of their historical appearance” as Foucauldian archaeology would require.
Thus, she did not answer the question of whether her use of the phrases “national security” and “foreign relations” were the same énoncés as the identical phrases in those Korean War-era cases.
The phrase “foreign relations,” when related to judicial deference, has
traditionally referred to the relations of our singular government to the government of other countries or to different international bodies.239 Within the
present discourse, however, the same syntagm is being used to refer to a
nebulous idea of presidential power that is defined and constructed in part
by the collateral space of the post-9/11 discourse. In other words, courts are
currently using “foreign relations” to describe particular events, such as a
war against an undefined group of multinational terrorists, that would not
be encompassed by its pre-9/11 énoncé. As Judge Wilkinson realized, it is
not self-evident that the constitutional considerations and policy justifications used to rationalize deference to the Executive in those past circumstances also justify the present deference when the Executive acts directly on
foreign individuals; the unity must be established by a principled, rigorous,
archaeological investigation.
Foucault opens The Archaeology of Knowledge by advocating for the
suspension of all unities, all “pre-existing forms of continuity,” and demands that these “syntheses that are accepted without question” be reexamined.240 He urges that “the tranquility with which they are accepted must
be disturbed; we must show that they do not come about of themselves, but
237
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are always the result of a construction.”241 In the legal sphere, Foucault’s
methodology is vital because, by undertaking to show the “construction” of
these purported syntheses, a judge makes transparent the fundamental principles on which her decision rests. Creating more transparent judicial decisions within the post-9/11 discourse will, in turn, create the opportunity for
disagreement and debate concerning the excavation and the foundational
plinths relied upon by each judge. This kind of dynamic, principled debate,
with no inherent assumptions or relationships, seems to be what the Supreme Court contemplated when it said, “The legal category of enemy
combatant has not been elaborated upon in great detail. The permissible
bounds of the category will be defined by the lower courts as subsequent
cases are presented to them.”242
Foucault’s insight demonstrates that a thorough, archaeological investigation of the post-9/11 discourse, like that of any discourse or discipline,
cannot be undertaken without scrutinizing the justifications for the parallels
and analogies it contains. To scrutinize the presupposed unity of terms, we
must endeavor “to tear away from them their virtual self-evidence . . . ; to
recognize that they are not the tranquil locus on the basis of which other
questions . . . may be posed, but that they themselves pose a whole cluster
of questions.”243 The judiciary, then, must tear all of the self-legitimizing
unities of post-9/11 discourse—national security, war, foreign relations,
enemy combatants, etc.—away from their “virtual self-evidence.” In the
post-Boumediene habeas litigation, most courts have been using these terms
as the tranquil locus of their reasoning, but they have not recognized that
these discursive constructs pose numerous questions in and of themselves.
Most significantly, are they the same énoncés used in historical judicial discourse such that their invocation in the post-9/11 context should bring about
the same legal outcome?
After this suspension of seemingly self-evident syntheses, a judge will
be able to excavate the post-9/11 discursive formation and construct a new
edifice with its plinths and fundamental construction transparent to all. According to Foucault, this archaeological endeavor occurs in three stages.
First, “the systematic erasure of all given unities enables us . . . to restore to
the statement the specificity of its occurrence.”244 Foucault wants to examine the “event,” “[h]owever banal,” of a concept entering a discourse,
which is linked not only to its causes and consequences, but also to the
“[énoncés] that precede and follow it.”245 Foucault says, “[W]e must grasp
the statement in the exact specificity of its occurrence; determine its conditions of existence, fix at least its limits, establish its correlations with other
241
242
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statements that may be connected with it, and show what other forms of
statement it excludes.”246 Second, the initial suspension of self-evident unities allows one to “leave oneself free to describe the interplay of relations”
both within and outside the discursive formation.247 Finally, Foucault argues that this suspension, “by freeing [a description of the facts of discourse] of all the groupings that purport to be natural, immediate, universal
unities,” allows an individual to describe new unities “but this time by
means of a group of controlled decisions.”248
In the post-Boumediene habeas litigation, then, suspending the historical unity of these énoncés will allow judges to first excavate the discursive
formation and the inherent relations and exclusions within the post-9/11
discourse. By confronting the imperfections of historical analogy, the different discursive relationships, and the exclusions the complementary space
entails, judges will be free to describe these relationships, both inside and
outside of the post-9/11 discourse. In other words, they will be forced to
enumerate what the differences are in this post-9/11 era and be free to describe how the historical ideas and post-9/11 discourse relate to one another. Most importantly, undertaking this excavation will then allow each
judge to make controlled, principled decisions about the implications of
these differences and to construct a framework that other judges can critique and refine. This kind of archaeological excavation will not only give
notice to the current and future members of the political branches about the
principles that should govern this new kind of war but will also create a dynamic, constructive dialogue between judges themselves. Because this proposal is somewhat abstract, the following section offers the Boumediene
opinions of Justices Kennedy and Scalia as an example of the contrast between the archaeological excavation for which this Note argues and the reliance on self-legitimizing énoncés that has characterized the habeas
litigation to this point. Justice Kennedy’s opinion undertakes the three
phases of excavation and construction outlined above and represents a superb model of Foucauldian archaeology, but Justice Scalia’s opinion emphasizes the “difficult time” of the post-9/11 era and relies on unexamined
énoncés to support his arguments.
B. Justice Kennedy’s Boumediene Opinion as an Archaeological Endeavor
Discussing the applicability of the “great writ” of habeas corpus in his
majority opinion in Boumediene, Justice Kennedy offered an example of
Foucauldian archaeology. His opinion opened with the specific factual scenario of the case: “Petitioners are aliens designated as enemy combatants
and detained at [Guantánamo].”249 His background section explained the
246
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specific legal context instead of beginning with the 9/11 attacks: “Under the
[AUMF], the President is authorized ‘to use all necessary and appropriate
force . . . .’”250 Justice Kennedy then began his excavation, offering an exhaustive analysis of the historical role of habeas corpus under English
common law and U.S. practice.251 In examining the extraterritorial reach of
habeas, Justice Kennedy did not assume that “sovereignty” in the historical
discourse and “sovereignty” in the post-9/11 discourses were the same
énoncé252 but suspended all presupposed syntheses and unearthed all of the
fundamental plinths of the historical place of habeas proceedings.
This fulfilled Foucault’s first goal of recognizing the emergence of an
énoncé and the historical context surrounding it. Indeed, Justice Kennedy
recognized new emergences—“the unique status of Guantanamo Bay and
the particular dangers of terrorism in the modern age”—and accepted that
“common-law courts simply may not have confronted cases with close parallels to this one.”253 Toward the close of his opinion, Justice Kennedy
noted that “[o]fficials charged with daily operational responsibility for our
security may consider a judicial discourse on the history of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 and like matters to be far removed from the Nation’s
present, urgent concerns.”254 He clearly recognized not only the novelty of
the situation but also the fact that such novelty meant terms such as “sovereignty” were situated in a new discursive formation and needed to be utilized.
The opening of Justice Scalia’s dissent, however, sounded in stark contrast to the legal doctrine that began Justice Kennedy’s opinion as well as to
the usual methodology of Justice Scalia’s opinions.255 He opened his discussion by abruptly announcing, “America is at war with radical Islamists”
and then proceeded to detail the number of deaths caused by each of a series
of terrorist attacks.256 He reached a crescendo with, “On September 11,
2001, the enemy brought the battle to American soil, killing 2,749 at the
Twin Towers in New York City, 184 at the Pentagon in Washington, D.C.,
and 40 in Pennsylvania.”257 This statement, no less than Hamdi’s “difficult
time,” immediately situated the discussion that followed within a particular
discourse, alerting the reader that the considerations that followed were inseparable from the discourse of 9/11 and based on more than legal principles. In these opening paragraphs, Justice Scalia continued his vivid
250
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description of the “difficult time,” claiming that “one need only walk about
buttressed and barricaded Washington, or board a plane anywhere in the
country, to know that the threat is a serious one.”258 Adopting a somewhat
fatalistic tone, he stridently criticized the Court’s decision on an extralegal
basis by predicting that the “devastating” decision would “almost certainly
cause more Americans to be killed.”259 Touching on enemy combatants,
war, and national security in one sentence, Justice Scalia argued that the
“blunders” of the majority opinion “make[] unnervingly clear [that] how to
handle enemy prisoners in this war will ultimately lie with the branch that
knows least about the national security concerns that the subject entails.”260
Justice Kennedy agreed that proper deference should be accorded to
the political branches in the realm of foreign affairs, citing United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,261 a classic case that immediately conjures the
principle of inherent foreign relations power.262 However, these statements
came only after he conducted the archaeological investigation of the discursive formation for which this Note advocates; he conducted an excavation
to determine how the fundamental constitutional and policy judgments the
historical principles contain related to the specific scenario confronting the
Court.
For example, Justice Kennedy’s discussion of sovereignty clearly contrasts with the automatic deference based on the unexplored idea of “national security” in Justice Scalia’s opinion. His excavation of “sovereignty”
demonstrates an innate understanding of Foucault’s insights about the need
for investigation and archaeology. Justice Kennedy began with the recognition that the “Court has held that questions of sovereignty are for the political branches to decide,”263 but then unearthed the plinth on which this
deference was traditionally based. Recognizing that “‘[s]overeignty’ is a
term used in many senses and is much abused,”264 he proceeded to note that
the historical deference was based on a reference to “sovereignty in the narrow, legal sense of the term”265 and not a reference to the “general, colloquial sense, meaning the exercise of dominion or power.”266 By suspending
the unity of past issues of war, national security, and sovereignty on which
Justice Scalia relied in his dissent, Justice Kennedy left himself free to de258
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scribe the “interplay of the relations”267 inside and outside of the discursive
formation.
After excavating the roots of the discourse about habeas and describing
the historical, institutional, and social relationships that he found important,
Justice Kennedy could then construct a new framework based on controlled,
principled decisions. For example, Justice Scalia relied heavily on Johnson
v. Eisentrager,268 a World War II case that held that the Court did not have
jurisdiction to hear the habeas petitions of German citizens who were held
on a U.S. base in Germany and who sought to challenge their conviction of
war crimes by a military commission.269 In Justice Kennedy’s discussion of
the case, though, he noted that the “historical context and nature of the military’s mission” was “far different” in that case.270 By suspending all of
these unities, Justice Kennedy freed himself from the “natural, immediate”
unities that Foucault describes and was able to construct new unities by a
series of “controlled decisions.” Justice Kennedy excavated the collateral,
correlative, and complementary spaces that are present within the énoncés
and the enunciative field of the post-9/11 discourse. He recognized the radical discontinuity of the historical and modern definitions of “sovereignty”
despite the self-legitimizing unity of the term.
By contrast, Justice Scalia’s dissent emphasized that Justice Kennedy
had failed to distinguish Eisentrager and had thus overruled its holding
without explicitly saying so. Although his point may be correct as a formal
matter, it can only be so if one accepts the self-legitimizing unities of the
discourse, e.g., the historical unity of World War II and the GWOT and the
unity of the idea of sovereignty in the two cases. Whether or not one agrees
with Justice Kennedy’s conclusion that these unities do not exist, he at least
addressed the issue on the fundamental discursive level of the énoncé and
offered an argument that can be disputed by others, such as Justice Scalia or
the political branches.271
Justice Kennedy approached the issue of the extraterritorial application
of habeas using the same archaeological method with which Judge Wilkin267
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son approached the detention issue in al-Marri. Both judges refused to let
the origin and radical discontinuity of 9/11 obscure the fact that other radical new emergences may be occurring within the discourse as well. After
excavating the discourse, both chose to construct new edifices that transparently rested on the plinths they had unearthed. As Judge Wilkinson recognized, this thorough excavation, recognition of new emergences, and
reconstruction of foundational principles constitute the obligations of the
judicial branch.
CONCLUSION
This Note contends that judges in the Guantánamo habeas cases, and in
future cases presenting “hard questions,” must engage the issues directly,
on a fundamental discursive level. One of the principal purposes of the
Judicial Branch is to control the excesses of the Executive and Legislative
Branches in order to protect individual liberties, especially during wartime.
The ancient writ of habeas corpus is one of the most salient examples of
this role.272 In recent habeas proceedings, however, the courts have spoken
from within the post-9/11 discursive formation and based their decisions on
foundational énoncés that necessarily preclude this power. Taking all “necessary and appropriate” measures in a discursively unified conception of
“war” may historically have included a fundamental power to detain combatants, but the inquiry should not end there. The judiciary may have a historical practice of deferring to the Executive in matters of “national
security” and “foreign affairs,” but that should not be the final word. Only
by exploring these self-legitimizing terms that carry so many inherent relationships to history, institutional practice, and the current discourse can a
judge both provide notice to the political branches and engage in the kind of
dynamic, constructive dialogue that will hone and test the issues confronting the judiciary today.
Professor Daniel Williams observed that it seems “as if the ontology of
‘enemy combatants’ was foisted upon us by 9/11.”273 He uses figurative
language to describe the way that the discourse obscures the fact that
“‘enemy combatant’ is a construct we have injected into our cultural milieu.”274 This description of the way it seems is actually a description of reality. There is no subject, no “we,” that created this “construct.” Instead,
the post-9/11 discursive formation has “foisted” upon the governmental
branches certain power relations and defined who has the authority to speak
under specific circumstances. As such, the discourse has constructed the
272

See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 739–45 (offering a detailed history of the Suspension Clause and
concluding that “[i]t ensures that, except during periods of formal suspension, the Judiciary will have a
time-tested device, the writ, to maintain the ‘delicate balance of governance’ that is itself the surest safeguard of liberty” (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004))).
273
Williams, supra note 15, at 387.
274
Id.

917

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

term “enemy combatants” by excluding other discourses and delineating
which actors have the authority to define it. The text of this discursive formation incorporates legal constructs—such as national security, noninternational conflict, unlawful enemy combatants, war, crime, and terrorism—that
all have significant collateral, correlative, and complementary spaces. Collectively, these énoncés construct the enunciative field from which the post9/11 discursive formation arises.
Judges hearing these habeas cases must tear the presupposed unity of
concepts like “war,” “national security,” and “enemy combatants” away
from their virtual self-evidence and excavate the discourse to examine and
wrestle with the “material remains,” the basic atoms (énoncés), of the discursive formation at their fundamental level. They should follow the example of Justice Kennedy in Boumediene, as well as that of Judge
Wilkinson in al-Marri. They must dissect the collateral space by exploring
the relationships among the various concepts within this discursive formation, unearth the correlative space by examining historical relationships and
unities in light of the radical discontinuity of 9/11, and expose the complementary space by explicitly discussing the institutional milieu and its distribution of power. Then, and only then, can judges, by a series of “controlled
decisions” draft a definition of “enemy combatants” and define the constitutional and statutory principles that should govern this new kind of war.
Whatever principles of deference and detention this archaeology establishes—whether they grant broad power to the Executive or institute significant
judicial review—will rest on plinths that have been firmly constructed out
of the partial remnants of former edifices. Although Judge Brown, among
others, has called for a legislative solution to this problem,275 judges should
“make no apologies”276 for attempting to construct principled answers. This
archaeological excavation is “emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department.”277
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